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1 Introduction
There has been a vast amount of literature on oligopolies over the past 60
years. Since Cournot (1838) [12] introduced his equilibrium, which was later
generalized by Nash (1951)[27], research in quantity games has progressed
from pure theory to take on much more of a behavioral character. Assump-
tions about information were relaxed allowing for different approaches to
develop. Especially since Alchian (1950) [1] the idea that it is only profit
maximization that drives firm behavior has been disputed. Many articles
sprung from Alchian’s insightful conclusion that firms do not have enough
information to be profit maximizers, and thus, it is the more successful firm
that is more likely to survive in the market and not the one that maximizes
absolute profits, as it does not know how to maximize. I introduce some of
that literature in section 2 of this dissertation.
Oligopolies are not only the most frequent market form encountered in re-
ality, which in itself makes them very interesting to study, but also, their
interactive character makes them an ideal candidate for laboratory experi-
ments1. Oligopolistic firms, unlike perfectly competitive ones, have power
over the market price, though, unlike with monopolies, it is limited, depend-
ing not only on one firm but on all firms acting in the oligopolistic market. It
follows that the market price is influences some by all acting firms. Theoret-
ical equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic quantity games are somewhere in
between perfect competition and monopolies, i.e. according to the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium firms earn positive economic profits with a resulting loss
in overall welfare compared to the efficient outcome of perfect competition
but smaller loss of welfare compared to the monopolistic outcome. Quan-
tity games in oligopolies (or Cournot games), in equilibrium, produce less
output than perfect competition resulting in a market price that lies above
marginal cost, which is why oligopolistic firms earn positive economic profits.
Assuming that firms have enough information to achieve an absolute profit
maximum is a rather strong assumption, which requires firms to have a deep
understanding of the market, and in particular, information about inverse
demand function and cost function. Obtaining information about inverse
demand and cost is either extremely costly or simply impossible due to the
complexity of the market. In order to understand how firms in oligopolistic
1see Riechmann (2008) [33] for a game theoretical workup of oligopolies.
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settings make choices, the game theoretical toolbox may be rendered useless,
as Schenk-Hoppe (2000) [38] points out, and new behavioral rules need to be
established.
Two important ideas that go back to Alchian (1950) [1], which have been
dominating the literature over the past 60 years, are imitation of successful
behavior and trial and error. Alchian’s notion is straight forward, if firms do
not know how to maximize, on account of limited information on inverse de-
mand and cost functions, thus not knowing how to achieve maximal profits,
they either learn from their competition by imitating behavior that is more
successful than their own, meaning if a firm earns larger profits than another,
the firms with the larger profit will be imitate, or firms may choose to simply
try new strategies and observe how successful they are. Vega-Redondo (1997)
[48] introduced a theoretical model based on imitation that showed that if
firms imitate the best, in terms of profit, and whenever firms have no memory
of previously achieved profits, thus not being able to compare their profits
to previous performance, the market will bring about a stable equilibrium at
the Walrasian outcome, where the market price equals marginal cost and no
economic profits can be earned. This is a large contradiction to the Cournot-
Nash outcome, where firms earn positive profits, and is based on exactly the
relaxation of the assumption that firms have information about the inverse
demand function. Vega-Redondo’s article, thus, implies that, if aggregate
output is below the perfectly competitive level, a firm that increases output
beyond the, here unknown optimal level of output, will outperform its compe-
tition if it produces more than its competition. This will generate the largest
profit for the firm with the highest level of output. This also means that
the increased level of output will lower the market price and shrink profits
for everyone, however, will give the firm with the highest output the largest
profit in the market. As there is no memory, firms only look at other firms
to compare and the one with the largest profit will be copied in the next
period. This process will converge at the competitive market equilibrium
were all profits cease. It follows that a firm hurts itself in absolute terms, by
increasing output, however, it will earn more than its competition creating a
better chance to survive in the market. Hamilton (1970) [18] called this spite-
ful behavior, when a firm is willing to hurt itself only to hurt others more (in
Vega-Redondo (1997) [48] this process is endogenous and firms may not real-
ize that they act spitefully). Vega-Redondo’s model is closely related to the
works of Maynard Smith and Price (1973) [43], who first introduced the con-
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cept of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) using Hamilton’s notion of spite.
A strategy is said to be evolutionary stable, if adopted by most members of
society, there exist no mutant strategy that yield higher reproductive fitness,
i.e. market survival. Given that it is firm survival in the market that dic-
tates behavior, visa vie being better than ones competition, spiteful behavior
may be an important behavioral trait research needs to consider. Hamilton’s
spite and Vega-Redondo’s model of imitation of successful behavior spawned
a large amount of laboratory experiments that aimed to test experimentally
how firms (players) behave when information about inverse demand is absent.
Quite a few experiment emerged to test how different types of information
changed firm behavior and, specifically, what is the directional development,
that is, can Cournot play be observed or does behavior in certain setting does
converge at the Walrasian equilibrium, as predicted by Vega-Redondo? Gen-
erally speaking, experimental results suggest that more information about
ones opponent renders the market more competitive while more aggregate
information will result in a movement closer to the Cournot prediction, see
for example Huck et al. (2000) [21].
The research focus and contribution of this dissertation lies in gaining a
clearer picture and better understanding of if, how, and why firms behave
spitefully when both relative profit maximizing strategies and absolute profit
maximizing strategies are available. In other words, is there a deeper reason
for spiteful behavior, other than the pure joy of beating ones competition,
and if yes, what is it? This implies that firms must be aware of being spiteful,
though they may not call it that, or on the contrary, playing absolute maxi-
mizing strategies. I, therefore, created a 2-period model in which firms, when
outperforming their competition, in terms of profit in period 1, would invest
into cost-saving technologies, resulting in cheaper ways to produce output,
decreasing marginal cost for the second (last) period. This finite dynamic
model is then applied to both a simultaneous moves (Cournot) duopoly model
and a sequential moves (Stackelberg) model. Derived theoretical solutions
show that the Cournot model results in a mixed strategy equilibrium with
the prediction of firms choosing Cournot quantites 71% of the time while
playing Walrasian quantities 29% of the time. Theory predicts that the
Stackelberg model results in one sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies with both Stackelberg leader and Stackelberg follower choosing ab-
solute profit maximizing quantities in both periods and no spiteful behavior.
These theoretical outcomes are then applied to two laboratory experiments
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examining players behavior in the 2-period model.
The results show that in the simultaneous moves model behavior is much
more competitive in period one than in period two. This suggest that play-
ers behave spitefully, i.e. choosing Walrasian strategies, if they can gain
competitive advantage by lowering marginal cost and, thus, earning larger
profits than otherwise possible. One explanation may be that firms behave
more competitive whenever there is a chance to gain market share, in their ul-
timate quest to gain monopoly status resulting in the largest possible profit.
Behavior in period two is close to theoretical prediction of Cournot play,
thus, if no more investment into cost-saving technologies takes place firms
maximize absolute profits, i.e. the Cournot outcome. Average payoffs in the
Cournot game were below theorized predictions and significantly lower than
in the sequential moves game.
In the Stackelberg game, results show that Cournot play is modal throughout
both periods. This is far from the theoretical prediction of absolute profit
maximizing Stackelberg play for both first and second mover. The reason
for this kind of behavior may be found in other-regarding preferences, and
in particular inequality aversion and cooperation. Theory predicts a large
discrepancy between Stackelberg leader and Stackelberg follower, in terms of
quantity and in terms of payoff, which may create friction between the play-
ers, as the Stackelberg follower may feel that she is being exploited in favor of
the Stackelberg leader. The experimental results suggest, though there still
is a significant difference in the average quantity of first and second move
between the two periods, it falls far short of the large differences predicted
by theory. In fact, there is only one case were players played a perfect Stack-
elberg outcome, while 39% of all games consisted of perfect Cournot play.
It follows that spiteful behavior serves a different purpose in the sequential
moves game, that is, it is used to punish Stackelberg leaders for trying to
gain an unequal payoff split. In fact, Equality in payoff appears to be the
driving force in the Stackelberg game, triggered by possible punishment of
Stackelberg followers and punishment fears of Stackelberg leaders. This re-
sults in output centering around the Cournot quantity.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized in the following way: in
section 2, I introduce some of the more prominent literature, from which
a learned great deal and which helped me structure and base ideas upon.
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Section 3 introduces the general model incorporating the research idea and
on which the two experiment in section 4 are based. Section 4 introduces said
experiments, which are parameterized versions of the general model. Section
5 explains the experimental procedures and section 6 is dedicated to report
on the results obtained from both simultaneous and sequential moves games.
I conclude this dissertation in section 7 with a summary of the findings and
some remarks.
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2 Literature Review
In 1964 Stiegler [46] wrote, ”No one has the right, and few the ability, to lure
economists into reading another article on oligopoly theory without some
advance indication of its alleged contribution.” A large amount of articles
has emerged since then and according to Selten et al. (1997) [40], ”After 150
years since Cournot (1838) [12] the duopoly problem is still open.” Selten
et al. (1997) [40] point out that, ”An empirically well supported duopoly
theory has not yet emerged.” The latter statement makes me confident that
scientific contribution may be inferred from this present dissertation.
Indeed, a vast number of papers have focused their attention on developing
such a theory, and headway has been made due to the insightful contribu-
tions of many authors. Since Cournot (1838) [12] developed his equilibrium
in oligopolies, which was later generalized by Nash (1951) [27] to become the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium at the point of best mutual responses, research has
set out to explain behavior beyond the traditional game theoretical methodol-
ogy. Although the Cournot-Nash equilibrium represent a theoretically sound
outcome, it is the assumptions of this model that have been widely criticized.
If all firms know exactly what the downward-sloping demand function, cost
function, and actions of all other firms look like, and one assumes that ab-
solute profit maximization is indeed what all rational-decision making firms
are after, then, a stable outcome is reached at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
However, this is not a scenario that seems overly realistic, and, as many au-
thors show, different outcomes emerge as the underlying assumption change.
Alchian (1950) [1] points out that if firms have uncertain foresight, profit
maximization may be rendered meaningless as a guide towards successful
decision-making, though, it is profits by which successful and surviving firms
are selected. It must therefore hold that the more successful firm and not the
profit-maximizing firm, as firms do not know how to maximize, will survive
in the market irrespective through what means. It is the firm that outper-
forms its competition that will generate positive profits, and that the crucial
point is its relative position in the market compared to its actual competitor
and not some hypothetical perfect profit maximizer. He continues to empha-
size the following important aspect, ”... models of behavior replace optimum
equilibrium conditions as guiding rules of action.” Alchian had, thus, suc-
cessfully ”opened the door” for behavioral economics to further analyze the
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duopoly model and suggested himself two mechanisms by which one could
achieve positive profits in the absence of perfect information.
1. Individual Adaptation Through Imitation
If firms do not know how to maximize, than firms will observe and copy more
successful competitors.
2. Trial and Error
Firms, through trial and error, may find more profitable ways to produce
and continue to develop towards more profitable production, which may be
seen as convergence towards a profit maximizing equilibrium.
Later research is based on exactly these two (and others) mechanisms [e.g.
see Vega-Redondo (1997) [48], Huck et a. 2000 [21], Apesteguia et al. (2010)
[5], Alo´s-Ferrer and Ania (2005) [3]].
Another important question concerns firm behavior even if perfect infor-
mation is assumed. In his 1953 book ”Essays in positive economics,” Milton
Friedman [16] argues that absolute profit maximization appropriately sum-
marizes the best strategy for a firm, and whenever a firm does not behave
in this manner it is likely to lose resources. Baumol (1958) [6] however, ar-
gued that firms are partially willing to forgo current profits in favor of future
sales. He observed that the typical larger corporation in the United States
maximizes revenues rather than profits, subject to a certain profit constraint.
This profit constraint appears to be in place to generate large enough cur-
rent profits to ensure growth with respect to expansion plans, dividends, and
future sales. To the best of this author’s knowledge, and next to Alchian
(1950) [1], Baumol’s 1958 paper is the first study that introduces a depar-
ture from pure short-run absolute profit maximizing objectives in exchange
of a relative performance objective, though, he did not call it that. Both
Alchian (1950) [1] and Baumol (1958) [6] triggered the further progress away
from a pure absolute performance driven Cournot-Nash outcome2.
Relative performance, rather than absolute performance, can be explained
by the following reasoning. Let us assume a symmetric two firm market,
2It is worth noting that an optimal outcome in relative profit maximization does repre-
sent a Nash equilibrium if the given objective is the maximization of relative performance
rather than absolute performance.
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where firms face downward-sloping demand and sell all produced commodi-
ties in the market. Both firms can achieve the same absolute profit maxi-
mum at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Now, if one chooses to deviate from
the Cournot-Nash outcome, by, say, increasing output beyond the Cournot-
suggested quantity, while the other firm strictly produces Cournot quantities,
then the deviating firm will raise total market output and lower the respec-
tive market price. The resulting outcomes in terms of profit are smaller for
both firms compared to the absolute profit maximum, however, the firm that
increased production will now outperform its competitor. Such behavior of
the output-increasing firm may be referred to as spiteful.
Hamilton (1970) [18] was the first to use the term spite in the following
sense, if an animal is ready to harm itself only to harm other even more,
then such behavior maybe called spiteful. Hamilton also explains that with
finite populations spiteful behavior may have its selective advantage and that
it should be looked for in dwindling panmictic species. Hamilton uses the
example of polygamous and promiscuous bower birds who wreck the bowers
of their neighbors to increase their own breeding chances, as an impressive
bower may be beneficial when finding a mate, i.e. relative attractiveness. He
also notes that the reason why one cannot find more convincing examples of
spite, is that actions are costly and that it may be hard to identify which
member of a species are less than average related, and thus ”fair game” to
practice spiteful behavior. Although Hamilton did not relate his article to
economics it became an essential building block for others to form new ideas
about economic behavior.
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) [43] developed the idea of an evolutionary
stable strategy (ESS) by using game theoretical methodology in connection
with Hamilton’s 1970 [18] notion of spite. In their important and influen-
tial paper, which was later generalized and brought into economic context
by Schaffer (1988) [36] and (1989) [37], they show that an ESS is a strategy
such that, if adopted by most members of a population there exist no mutant
strategy that would result in higher reproductive fitness. As already men-
tioned, it was Schaffer (1988) [36] and (1989) [37] who brought the idea of
evolutionary stable strategies into economic context by extending on May-
nard Smith and Price (1973) [43] to generalize the model to hold for finite
populations (N) and variable contest size (C). Schaffer (1988) [36] assumes
a population of size N, entirely consisting of ESS strategies (sESS). Now,
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one ESS strategy is replaced by a mutant strategy (sM). It follows that the
probability of an ESS player facing a mutant player is: C−1
N−1 and that the
profit function for the ESS player is:
max
sM
piESS =
(
1− C − 1
N − 1
)
pi
(
sESS|sESS, sESS, sESS, ...)
+
C − 1
N − 1pi
(
sESS|sM , sESS, sESS, ...) (1)
For the single mutant player the profit function is
piM = pi
(
sM |sESS, sESS, sESS, ...) (2)
as she will play only ESS players. According to Maynard Smith and Price
(1973) [43] the equilibrium condition then becomes:
piM ≤ piESS (3)
Equivalently, one may say that piM − piESS as a function of sM reaches its
maximum value of zero at sM = sESS. Thus, sESS is a solution to the
following maximization problem: maxsM pi
M − piESS and substitution of (1)
and (2) leads to
max
sm
pi
(
sM |sESS, sESS, sESS, ...)− C − 1
N − 1pi
(
sESS|sm, sESS, sESS, ...) (4)
From this, one can infer an important fact, namely, an ESS player is not
generally maximizing her own payoff but rather the difference between her
payoff and the population’s mean payoff. This is in line with the point that
Hamilton (1970) [18] made and referred to as spiteful behavior, as one is
willing to hurt oneself in order to hurt others even more.
In Schaffer (1989) [37], he extends on his 1988 paper of ESS and points out
that absolute profit maximizing behavior may not be an ESS and that such
profit maximizers may not be the best survivors. He argues that Friedman’s
1953 [16] conjecture of absolute profit maximization may only be evolution-
ary stable if the market is one of perfect competition, ”Only in the case of
perfect competition, when firms have no market power ... is absolute-profit
maximization always an ’appropriate summary’. This result is a consequence
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of the Darwinian definition of economic natural selection, whereby it is the
’fittest’ firms which survive.” Schaffer (1989) [37] as well as Hamilton (1970)
[18] demonstrates that spiteful behavior could exist if the size of the pop-
ulation was not very large (oligopolies). In fact, spite may disappear in
sufficiently large populations (perfect competition). Thus, whenever firms
have market power, there exist potential for spiteful behavior. This was al-
ready pointed out by Alchin 1950 [1], where it was the relative position that
mattered as firms are unable to maximize due to their limited knowledge.
Schaffer’s 1989 model does not suggest that relative profit maximization is
the best strategy for survival, however, it represents the strategy that is more
likely to survive.
Another influential article by Vega-Redondo (1997) [48] describes that Wal-
rasian behavior3 evolves in the long-run within any quantity-setting oligopolis-
tic market, when all firms produce the same good and face a downward slop-
ing demand curve. The analysis in this paper can be summarized as follows:
Firms in a Cournot game select their strategies simultaneously in every pe-
riod. As time continues the most successful behavior will be adopted by
most players, e.g. through imitation. Occasionally, with some small proba-
bility (e → 0) firms deviate, a.k.a. experiment or mutate [see also Alchian
(1950) [1] Schaffer (1988) [36]]. Without the occasionally experimenter be-
havior would remain in some monomorphic state and, unless the Walrasian
outcome has already been reached, not converge. The approach is straight
forwards, if the experimenting firm changes its output towards more lucrative
options, i.e. into the direction in which higher payoff lie, it will be copied
and the market adopts to this new better position in the next period, due to
the imitative behavior of other firms.
Vega-Redondo (1997) [48] describes an explicitly dynamic model related to
Alchin (1950) [1] ideas but in contrast to Friedman (1953) [16] who suggested
that market forces will be in line with rational behavior, i.e. absolute per-
formance (Cournot-Nash). His model encompasses the usual monotonicity
of preferences (more is better) considerations of evolutionary theory, i.e. ad-
justing strategies may be influenced by differences in payoffs between players.
3named after French economist Leon Walras (1834-1910) for his contribution to general
equilibrium theory. The Walrasian quantity refers to perfectly competitive behavior, i.e.
a quantity that will equate marginal cost and market price driving economic profits to the
zero margin.
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This learning dynamics may thus be viewed as a form of bounded rationality,
i.e. an objective of performing better, or not worse, than competition, while
surrendering absolute performance. In other words, in the real world, firms
face complex decisions and imitation of successful strategies may be a reason-
able rule of thumb. As population increases in size the usual consideration
is that the market outcome moves from Cournot-Nash to the Walrasian out-
come (perfect competition) at higher output, lower market price, and zero
economic profits for all symmetric market participants. Vega-Redondo’s im-
portant lesson is that in his finite firms setting, the Walrasian outcome is
reached where classical game theory suggests Cournot-Nash. He argues that
if a firm’s objective function includes survival consideration as its primary
focus, then even with classical consideration (perfectly rational behavior and
common knowledge) Walrasian behavior would be established. This would
make firms, even in oligopolistic setting, relative rather than absolute profit
maximizers, resulting in zero economic profits as marginal cost equal the
market price. A similar result was presented in Rhode and Stegeman (2001)
[30], where the authors show that, under general circumstances, the mean
Darwinian strategy pair presents a Nash equilibrium (NE) of relative profit
maximizing agents.
The above mentioned articles gave rise to a rather large number of publi-
cations reporting on controlled laboratory experiments that focused on be-
havior in oligopolistic quantity games. I will continue to discuss some of
the finding in the following. Rosenthal et al. (1984) [34] studied infinitely
repeated 2 player games with ruin. Their focus lies within the impatience
in preferences, which is brought about by the possibility of ruin and, thus,
may result in permanent short-run effects such as elimination of competi-
tion. For players, these short-run effects may take priority over, for example,
profit maximization. Thus, only after these short-run considerations have
been considered, may the firm focus on long-run payoffs. The authors give
the example of a monopolist who can expect larger profits than a duopolist
and that the duopolist may decide to forgo short-run profits as the firms may
try to compete it’s way to a monopolistic position, which would more than
offsets the foregone short-run duopoly profits. They observe that when one
player can ruin her opponent, she does; and that players must protect them-
selves against such strategies, which could force them into ruin. Thus, it may
be advisable for players to focus on maximal spite to either gain competitive
advantage in the future or to insulate against being outperformed and, thus,
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possible market exit. In Cournot quantity games, for example, this would
mean maximizing relative rather than absolute profits, until a monopoly po-
sition is reached.
Vriend (2000) [49] studies a genetic algorithm to point out the differences in
learning dynamics. He very appropriately points out that there are two as-
pects to spite: one being purely spiteful players that receive enjoyment from
beating others, thus there exist preferences for spiteful behavior and sec-
ond, spiteful behavior relating to the limited perception of players (bounded
rationality, learning, information etc). The author focuses on the second as-
pect. The genetic algorithm with individual learning converges towards the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium while the genetic algorithm with social learning
converges towards the Walrasian outcome, due to the spite effect. Individ-
ual learning refers to the fact that agents learn exclusively on the basis of
their own experiences, while with social learning agents learn from the expe-
riences of other players. This article is of particular interest to the present
dissertation, as spiteful behavior may in fact be separated into different cat-
egories, i.e. there may be reasons, other than the joy of being better, as to
why players choose spiteful strategies. The two period experimental setup
of this dissertation makes exactly this point, firms may behave spitefully in
period one only to gain competitive advantage in period two. Bester (1993)
[9] states that the closer substitutes the good are, the larger the amount of
investment into cost reduction may be. Thus, in this dissertation’s experi-
mental two period model, spiteful behavior in period one maybe extreme in
order to reduce cost in period two.
Fershtman (1987) [14] studies a duopolistic market where giving managers
incentives that combine revenue and profit maximization (instead of just
profit maximization) may be a dominant strategy for owners. It is argued
that traditional price theory is based on the simplified concept that firms’
sole objective is profit maximization [see also Baumol (1958) [6]] and that
managerial compensation is most often based on sales, which provides self-
interested managers with an incentive to sacrifice profit opportunities when-
ever there is conflict with pure sales quantities. On the other hand providing
managers with the incentive to focus on profits may result in short-run profit
maximization without ensuring the firms long-run growth and fitness. Fer-
shtman argues that maximization of a single objective cannot capture the
interaction of all decision makers within the firm.
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Tanaka (1999) [47] bases his paper largely on the articles by Vega-Redondo
(1997) [48], Schaffer (1988) [36] and Schaffer (1989) [37] and introduces an
oligopoly model with 2 groups: one group are the high cost firms and the
other group the low cost firms. All firms produce the same homogeneous
good and compete in quantities. He shows that the finite population evolu-
tionary stable strategy (ESS) is equal to the Walrasian output quantity in
each group.
A different result is discussed in Milgrom and Roberts (1991) [25], who devel-
oped their take on adaptive (sophisticated) learning, see Alchian (1950) [1].
They argue that most strategy games are dominated by equilibrium analysis.
Yet, this implies the assumption that players are immediately and unerringly
find and play a particular vector of equilibrium strategies, i.e. by assump-
tion the equilibrium is common knowledge4. This, however, seems like a
far-fetched assumption as in reality firms do not posses common knowledge
and are unable to immediately, if ever, identify an optimal strategy. The
alternative to analyzing behavior lies in learning dynamics, i.e. this implies
a certain set of rules that apply during repetition of a certain game accord-
ing to which players form expectations of other players’ current choices as
a function of past play. According to the authors this is as far-fetched an
assumption as equilibrium play, as firms will not merely base their decision
based on some rule about past play, i.e. they are intelligent and learn to
learn by combining past experiences with whatever else that may contribute
to making appropriate decisions. The authors show with a very broad model
encompassing all previously discussed information and learning that over
time players will converge to the Nash equilibrium.
Conlisk (1980) [11] argues along the same lines as Milgrom and Roberts
(1991) [25] and that optimal outcomes are extremely hard and costly to
discover. The normal assumption of rational players where behavior will
eventually lead players to a steady state equilibrium may be far fetched. In
his article, he creates two groups of players, optimizers and imitators, and
finds that if optimizing is very costly, imitators will have as great a survival
rate in the long run as costly optimizing behavior does.
4in economic laboratory experiments this would be a payoff table handed to subjects
that would allow them to identify equilibrium play
22
Similar to Milgrom and Roberts (1991) [25], Rassenti et al.’s (2000) [29]
goal is to shed some light on whether or not there exists convergence towards
equilibrium behavior. They report on 3 different experiments of 75 periods
(allowing for sufficient time for convergence). In one experiment subjects
were informed about all choices of each subject in the market (SHOW). In
another (NOSHOW) subjects were informed only about total output of all
subjects. The third experiment consisted of 15 rounds of a certain set of pa-
rameters followed by a different set of parameters of 60 rounds, all subjects
were able to observe past play of all opponents (15/60SHOW). The authors
report on 2 contradicting theories, (1) Vega-Redondo (1997) [48] would pre-
dict that with more information subject behavior would become more com-
petitive, while (2) Stigler (1964) [46] argues that with more information of
individual output firms would facilitate collusion as more information about
individual behavior would make it easier to detect defective behavior. In all
experiments individuals were informed about the demand function, how the
market price is generated and about their own constant level of marginal
cost, and the fact that other firms may not have the same cost structure
(asymmetric payoffs), which was the case in the experiment, creating no
symmetric equilibria. The results suggest that total output, over all time
periods and all 3 experiments, is greater than but still close to the NE. An
interesting fact observed was that though total output is somewhat close to
the Cournot prediction, individual output fluctuated far from that prediction.
Selten et al. (1997) [40] report on a finite super game of asymmetric Cournot
duopoly. The authors chose a finite set, on account of infinitely many strate-
gies, which may be attempted through fixed stopping point probabilities, are
unsatisfactory due to the limited time horizon in experimental settings. Addi-
tionally, experimental evidence suggest that, except for a possible end effect,
finite and infinite time horizons show no significant behavioral difference [see
also Selten and Stoecken (1986) [42]]. The experiments, which I report on
in the following sections, and its finite time horizon is based on exactly this
reasoning. The results indicate that for experienced players, behavior is very
different than predicted by theory, in that, cooperative goals are chosen by
fairness consideration and pursued by a certain set of strategies. The au-
thors explain that a cooperative goal is chosen individually by means of an
ideal point, at which individuals try to accomplish cooperation. If the oppo-
nent moves towards this ideal point, players’ responses tend to move output
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towards the ideal point. If the opponent moves away from the ideal point
then players react by moving away from the ideal point of cooperation. The
choice of an ideal point by fairness consideration along with a measure-for-
measure policy constitutes a very simple approach that avoids optimization
problems altogether. It is also a simple strategy towards profit maximization.
In Selten and Ostman (2000) [41], the Nobel Laureate shows that symmet-
ric duopolies with with common knowledge of demand and cost function,
as well as communication seems to have a tendency towards collusive be-
havior, while asymmetric duopolies without communication and with little
information about other players’ profits have the tendency to converge to-
wards the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, though recent experimental literature
indicate differently, e.g. Huck et al. (1999) [20], in that output is in fact
larger than that predicted by Cournot. The authors found that in a sym-
metric Cournot model with constant marginal cost with a universal reference
structure, meaning a set of players assigned to each player, which are suffi-
ciently similar in structure, has a unique local imitation equilibrium at the
Walrasian outcome (local equilibrium refers to the fact that it is stable with
respect to small exploratory deviations whereas a global imitation equilib-
rium requires stability against any exploratory deviation). The authors were
also able to show that in Cournot duopolies with asymmetric cost and and
with the same reference structure, again, referring to similarity in structure,
converges to the shared monopoly outcome.
Bernhardt and Bergin (2004) [8] discuss theoretically two types of learning
dynamics. Their contribution lies in their analysis of how long-run equilib-
rium outcomes depend on the historical information received through those
two learning dynamics. The two types of learning discussed are learning by
imitation of others and learning by introspection, meaning individual learn-
ing, see also Riechmann (2006a) [32] and Riechmann (2006b) [31]. With in-
trospection players learn from their own current and past actions and select
the output level that generated the greatest payoff. With imitation players
learn by comparing their payoff from current and past periods to those of all
similarly situated player and selects the most successful action, i.e. players
believe that other players’ experiences are relevant to them. An important
point is that it is not only the fact the the two types are separated by own
versus other information, but also that players in the imitation framework
know that their own action will affect the outcome of others (externality).
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Thus, with introspective learning a choice is good if payoff in this period is
larger than payoff in the previous period. With imitation on the other hand
a choice may be considered good if it merely lowered the payoff of other play-
ers compared to one self. This also means that introspective learning and
imitative learning correspond to one another if there is no externality effect
present. The results show that introspective learning leads to the Nash equi-
librium and that for imitative dynamics the outcome lies in the point where
no player can increase the difference between himself and other players, i.e.
the Walrasian outcome. It follows that the payoffs of imitative behavior are
lower than those of retrospective learning, thus mimicking the best leads to
lower absolute profits.
Bernhardt and Bergin (2004) [8] base their analysis on the work of Vega-
Redondo (1997) [48] and Schlag (1998) [39]. Schlag creates two groups of
players. Two players are then randomly matched from the two groups. The
players observe their own payoff and additionally the payoff of some other
player from their own group matched up with a player from the other group.
Players never observe the payoff of their opponents, however, they do observe
the payoff of the player in their own group playing an opponent from the other
group. Thus, a player learns from herself and another player playing against
the same population, thus creating a scenario without an externality effect.
Similarly, in Apesteguia et al. (2007) [4] the authors set out to experimen-
tally test how information, and more specifically information about one’s
direct competitor or information about a player that is just like them but
plays in a different group against different players, effects play. In particular
two theories are tested, which are the one by Vega-Redondo (1997) [48] and
Schlag (1998)[39]. Vega-Redondo (1997) [48] predicts the Walrasian outcome
in games where players can observe their immediate opponent, while Schlag
(1998) [39] predicts the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when agents imitate oth-
ers who are like them but play in different markets. The authors show that
the difference between the two models lies mainly in the different informa-
tional assumptions rather than the specific adjustment rules, meaning that it
is more important whom to imitate than how. It is found that the treatment
in which opponents can be observed each other directly is the most com-
petitive one and the treatment where players of other groups are observed
coincided roughly with Cournot-Nash. Intermediate results are obtained if
players can observe both. They also found that imitation is an increasing
function in the size of relative profits, i.e. the larger the difference in payoffs
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between players the more likely is imitation. Also, and in line with Schlag
(1998) [39], the probability with which a player changes her action decreases
in her own payoff and increases in the maximal observed payoff. Thus, it
can be concluded that the probability to imitate the best strategy is mainly
driven by the difference in the maximal observed and own payoff. A ques-
tionnaire result suggested that most imitators know that they were imitating
5.
Another component is added by Alo´s-Ferrer (2004) [2], who introduces mem-
ory to the quantity choice setting. He argues that in Vega-Redondo (1997)
[48] Walrasian outcomes are achieved as players do not have memory and thus
cannot compare deviations to previous results and only compare themselves
to their opponent in any particular period. He finds that when memory of
at least one period is introduced that the outcome lies somewhere between
Cournot and Walras. He presents memory as some kind of conditional exper-
iment as players, if they chose a quantity that results in lower then previous
period profits, may go back to the previous period’s profit, realizing their
mistake and correcting it. He argues that from an industrial organization
point of view his paper highlights the instability of quantities above the Wal-
rasian quantity and below the Cournot quantity but neither of them being a
unique solution.
Bergin and Bernhardt (2009) [7] study long-run outcomes of imitation in
symmetric games when players base their decision on average historical per-
formance. Thus, just like Alo´s-Ferrer (2004) [2], the Vega-Redondo (1997)
[48] assumption that firms do not obtain memory, is relaxed. They find that
with sufficiently long memory imitation leads to the joint profit maximum,
i.e. collusion, and the longer the time horizon the stronger the collusive ef-
fect. Cooperation on a period-to-period basis is rooted in the fact that firms
understand the need to maintain relationships. The authors shows that co-
operation arises naturally from imitation of successful behavior when agents
have limited information and limited ability to optimize. If memory only last
one period, payoffs can decline without players taking notice, if past perfor-
mance will go unnoticed leading to the competitive outcome, thus imitation
5I always find it very interesting what players report on how they came to make a
certain decision, which is why I included some of the statements made in the following
experiment.
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of successful strategies will lead to overall decrease profit and thus, wel-
fare. This is the point that Vega-Redondo (1997) [48] made. If players have
sufficiently long memory and the corresponding historical weighted average
in those particular periods are recalled, then, and provided that sufficient
weight is placed on this memory, the unique stochastically stable outcome is
the monopoly outcome.
The next few studies I would like to mention here report on experimen-
tal findings in oligopoly quantity games and are mostly based on the work
of three authors, (1) Steffen Huck of university College London, (2) Hans-
Theo Normann of Royal Holloway College, University of London, and (3)
Joerg Oechssler of Heidelberg University.6 Over the past 13 years these au-
thors have presented experimental results, among others, in quantity games
contributing to a much better understanding of how information influences
decision making in this particular market setting. In Huck et al. (1999)[20]
the authors set up an oligopoly to test the competitiveness of firms when
varying information. Largely based on Vega-Reondos (1997) [48] imitation
model, they test their model with inertia, which does theoretically converge
at Cournot-Nash. The authors create five treatments varying the information
given to players in each treatment. The following results are obtained. In all
treatments behavior was more competitive than predicted by the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium. When given sufficient information about price, players’
behavior matched that predicted by Vega-Redondo (1997) [48] where firms
converge at the Walrasian equilibrium. In general, more information about
the market yields less competitive outcomes while more information about
ones’ competition yields more competitive outcomes. If players have suffi-
cient information to play best-replies, most will do so, though, not perfectly
converging towards the theoretically predicted outcome. If players have the
necessary information to imitate some players, some will become pure imita-
tors of most successful strategies.
Offerman et al. (2002) [28], for example, show similar results with the dif-
ference being that in Huck et al. (1999) [20] information mattered at the
beginning of the experiment while in their experiment information is varied
throughout. They find that when information is available only on aggregate
quantities then the frequency distribution is centered around Cournot-Nash.
6The reported Universities are current at the time this dissertation was worked on and
may have changed.
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When information about individual quantities are available there exist two
peaks, one at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the other at the collusive
outcome. When adding information about individual profit to individual
output quantities outcomes are centered around the Walrasian outcome and
also around the collusive outcome with Cournot-Nash losing its appeal.
In Huck et al. (2000) [21] two treatments are introduced, one where partici-
pants only have information about aggregate information about opponents’
actions and one where players have received information about individual
action (quantity or price and profits) in both treatments all participants re-
ceived all necessary information about the market structure. The market
consisted of four symmetric firms with differentiated products. For Cournot
competition it is found that more information makes the market more com-
petitive, again, supporting Vega-Redondo’s (1997) [48] imitation model. If
subjects only have aggregate information players’ behavior converges towards
the Nash equilibrium. In neither the Cournot nor the Bertrand case does
more information about the rivals’ actions lead to collusive behavior, as for
example suggested by Stiegler (1964)[46]. It was also found that if the goods
are strategic substitutes more information about opponents’ actions and prof-
its increase competition while in case of strategic complement additional in-
formation does not seem to influence decision making.
One of the most influential studies for this present dissertation is the paper by
Huck et al. (2001)[19], who study a Stackelberg duopoly experimentally and
compare to the simultaneous moves model of a standard Cournot case. Two
treatments were run, where in the first treatment players remained matched
to the same opponent throughout the entire game, in the second treatment
opponents were randomly assigned after every period without allowing for
meeting the same opponent twice. To the best of the authors knowledge,
their sequential Stackelberg model has never been tested experimentally7.
Huck et al.’s 2001 [19] results show that the simultaneous decision making
process under a standard Cournot case is well predicted by theory. For the
Stackelberg sequential moves game theory predicts higher output, lower ag-
gregate profits, and higher efficiency due to the increase in consumer surplus,
7One of the experiments introduced in a later section of this dissertation also analyzes
a sequential moves model. However, the model is considerably different from the one
introduced by Huck et al. (2001)[19], in that, it shows a two period model with the
possibility of asymmetry.
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which offsets the decrease in producer surplus resulting in an increase in over-
all welfare. Experimental results show that for both treatments (fixed and
random matching) Stackelberg output is higher than output under Cournot.
Under the fixed pair treatment (similar to the sequential moves model in-
troduced in the experimental section of this dissertation) aggregate output
is lower than under the random matching for both Counot and Stackelberg.
The authors find that there is much less collusion in Stackelberg markets
than in Cournot markets. They also report considerable deviation from the
theorized output in the Stackelberg market, and that when pairs are fixed,
markets become less competitive, i.e. Stackelberg leaders produce, on av-
erage, less than theoretically predicted, while Stackelberg followers produce
more than theoretically predicted. The authors argue that this is in line
with the prediction of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) [13], and that the behavior
of the Stackelberg follower can be explained through reward for cooperative
behavior of the Stackelberg leader and punishment of the Stackelberg leader
for choosing an exploitative approach, thus, indicating inequality aversion.
This is an important point, as the experimental results in section 6 (sequen-
tial moves model) show how competitive first and second movers’ choices
become when second movers are able to punish first movers. As I will show
in section 6, Stackelberg followers, indeed, punish Stackelberg leaders for ex-
ploiting their first mover’s advantage.
Related to Huck et al. (2001) [19] is the article by Fonseca et al. (2005)
[15], in which the authors study an oligopoly game with endogenous tim-
ing. The model is based on Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) [17] who set up a
duopoly model in which firms can choose to produce their quantity in one
of two periods before the market clears, with the prediction of a Stackelberg
leadership emergence. Huck et al. (2002) [22] found that despite theoret-
ical predictions Stackelberg leadership almost never emerges. Instead they
found that the Cournot-Nash was achieved in about 50% of all plays. Fon-
seca et al. (2005)[15] added asymmetry to the model which, theoretically,
should strengthen the emergence of Stackelberg leadership of the low-cost
firm. However, experimental data in this paper suggest that despite the in-
troduced asymmetry in cost no significant differences compared to the sym-
metric case can be observed and the previous results of Huck et al. (2002)[22]
are robust and Cournot play is the most frequently played quantity.
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A different approach is reported on in Huck et al. (2004) [23], wherein
the authors study a simple learning process, which they call trial-and-error.
Players receive no information about their rival at all. The only thing hap-
pening in their experiment is that players can decided to increase or decrease
output each period. They observe whether their decision either increases or
decreases output and payoff. If their quantity choice increased payoff then
they will continue to increase output. If their decision decreased payoff then
they will lower output in the next period. The setup is a standard symmetric
Cournot oligopoly and the interesting results show that this trial-and-error
process leads towards the joint profit maximum (collusion). The remarkable
results show that players end up in the joint profit maximum without the
ability to observe their opponent and, thus, there is no basis for coordination
and punishment. The argument is as follows, if players move closer towards
the collusive outcome, thus increasing their profits, they will continue to
move into that direction. Once they reach the joint profit maximum further
movement will lower profits. Hence, there exists a locally stable ”collusive
cycle.” This is surprising as players know nothing about their own payoff
function and have no information about their opponents8.
A closer look into cost asymmetry and imitation was offered by Apesteguia
et al. (2010) [5]. They find, based on Vega-Redondo’s 1997 [48] model, that
imitation, when players can observe successful strategies, will emerge and
the Walrasian outcome can be observed. This result, however, is theoreti-
cally fragile to the slightest cost asymmetry. Their experiment, on the other
hand, shows that in both symmetric and asymmetric setting firms converge
to the competitive solution. Theory predicts that when firms have the same
cost function and are located in some state other than the perfectly compet-
itive state, any mutation towards the Walrasian state will be imitated. This
is straight forward, whenever price exceeds marginal cost, a move towards
the Walrasian quantity will leave the firm with the highest quantity and the
largest profit, and, thus, it’s strategy will be copied by others in the follow-
ing period. If the price is below marginal cost, then the firm with the lowest
quantity will make the smallest loss and will be copied, thus if firms face
identical cost functions (symmetric market) the Walrasian state is stochas-
tically stable. If, however, a firm has a cost advantage over its competitors
8This is what Reinhard Selten refered to as directional learning, see Selten and Stoecker
(1986) [42]
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(asymmetric setting), it may move away from the Walrasian quantity and
still earn larger profits, and thus, will be imitated without other firms realiz-
ing the mutants cost advantage, which would render the Walrasian outcome
not stable, i.e. once a firms imitated unsuccessfully it may revert to its previ-
ous quantity. Nonetheless, their experimental evidence suggest no significant
differences between the symmetric and asymmetric treatment. Brander and
Spences (1983) [45] show that in Cournot duopoly a cost reduction by one
firm lowers the output of its competitor if the setting is asymmetric. As
the market price in negatively related with aggregate market output, cost
reduction (e.g. in this dissertation’s experimental section, firms may invest
into cost-saving technologies to lower cost in the following period) may be a
strong point on the Cournot firm’s preference list, see also Spence (1984) [44].
It is worth mentioning that there are a few studies that report on a two
period model, however, the market in these models only clears once after
period two. Though this setup does not match this dissertation’s two pe-
riod model, some interesting point have been made. Mueller (2006) [26]
investigates a duopoly experimentally. The model employed is taken from
Saloner (1987) [35]. Theory predicts the emergence of a Stackeberg outcome
although there is some experimental evidence that suggests differently. Due
large payoff differences for the first and second mover and, i.e. inequality in
payoffs, some authors, see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) [13] and Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000)[10], show that subjects display an aversion to disadvantageous
inequality, suggesting that Stackelberg outcomes are unlikely to evolve and
often times Cournot outcomes or collusive play may be observed, see Huck
et al. (2002) [22]. Only eight percent of the time did the author observe
Stackelberg outcomes, thus players did not seriously attempt to establish a
Stackelberg play. The two period set up also did not yield higher total out-
put at a lower market price as suggest by theory. In fact average output was
the same as in the one period Cournot markets that were set up as a control
group. This suggests that the Stackelberg outcome seems very unlikely to
evolve in this particular setup and may just be explained by inequality aver-
sion. This can also be confirmed in this dissertation’s experimental findings
where only one duopoly in only one out of 20 periods successfully established
Stackelberg play.
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3 General Model
Consider the following duopoly model, where the superscript t indicates time.
The model consists of two time periods in total, allowing firms, if successfully
outperforming its competition in period one, to lower marginal cost for period
two. Thus, the model, though starting in symmetry, may turn asymmetric
after period one.
P t(Y t) = a− Y t, where a > 0 and Y t =
2∑
i=1
yti (5)
Ct(yti) = b(1− δti)yti , where (6)
δti =
pit−1i − pit−1−i
pit−1i
,∀ pit−1i > pit−1−i > 0, else δti = 0 and b > 0 (7)
Both firms start out in symmetry. Inverse demand is given by P t(Y t) and
downward sloping. All output is sold in the market immediately and there is
no stock-building. The cost function’s δti does not exist in period one, as it
depends on the previous period’s outcome and no such period yet exists, i.e.
assuming t is the first ever period. Thus, in period one, firms’ cost functions
are:
Ct(yti) = by
t
i (8)
The above model will be analyzed theoretically and, thereafter, a parametrized
version of the model will be tested experimentally as part of a controlled labo-
ratory experiment. In the following I will break down the model into a game
of simultaneous moves and one of sequential moves. In the simultaneous
moves model I will break down the analysis into 4 cases in period one, upon
which period two analysis will depend, i.e. maximizing absolute profits in
period one, where firms forgo the possibility to lower marginal cost in period
two for larger immediate profits in period one, maximizing relative profits in
period one for a chance to achieve the largest possible δi for period two, and
the mixed case where one firm chooses to maximize absolute profits while
the other firm chooses to maximize relative profits, in which case the relative
profit maximizer achieves the largest possible δi and, thus, lowering cost for
period two by the maximal amount, however at the expense of lower imme-
diate absolute profits. Thus, there are 2 cases where firms choose identical
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strategies, that is, both firms choose to maximize absolute profits in period
one or both firms choose to maximize relative profits in period one. Both of
these scenarios result in the same marginal cost in period two as in period
one and consequently δi = 0. The other 2 cases, which, due to symmetry,
are really only 1 case, namely, one firm chooses to maximize relative profits
in period one (the Walrasian player) while the other firm maximizes abso-
lute profits (the Cournot player) to achieve a competitive advantage over its
competition in period two, due to the decrease in cost at an expense of lower
immediate profits, though, still outperforming the Cournot player in period
one in terms of profit.
In the sequential moves game, the situation is somewhat different, as even
if firms choose absolute profit maximizing strategies, the Stackelberg leader
will gain competitive advantage in period two due to a positive relative profit
in period one. I will also show that, for the first mover, it makes no difference
whether she is an absolute or relative profit maximizer as the optimal output
decision is the same for absolute and relative profit maximizers. However, the
model’s outcome does change as the second mover alters his strategy from
absolute to relative profit maximization. Therefore, period one outcomes will
depend on the second mover’s preference to either maximize absolute profits
or relative profits in period one. In neither case will the second mover achieve
positive relative profits and has no chance to lower marginal cost in period
two. The 2 cases under the sequential moves game for period one are: i. The
first mover plays an absolute (identical to relative) profit maximizing strat-
egy while the second mover plays an absolute profit maximizing strategy and
ii. The first mover plays an absolute (identical to relative) profit maximizing
strategy while the second mover plays a relative profit maximizing strategy.
I start the analysis with the simultaneous moves game with a straight forward
computation of these first period strategies (in terms of absolute and relative
profit maximization). Period two choices will depend on the outcomes of
period one, i.e. for the simultaneous moves model there exist 4 cases, 2 of
which are merely the reversal of firms (firm i is an absolute profit maximizer
while firm -i is a relative profit maximizer and vice versa) and it is sufficient
to to compute only one of these two scenarios.
Due to the two period bound of the model, and the fact that the possi-
bility to lower marginal cost only exists once, after period one, period two
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choices may only consist of absolute profit maximizing decisions, as there is
not further period to consider. Thus one might ask why relative profit max-
imizing strategies are at all part of the choice vector. The answer may lie
in other-regarding preferences. Firms may have preferences towards simply
being better than their competition, while sacrificing absolute performance.
On the other hand, firms may have preferences not to be outperformed and,
thus, relative profit maximizing strategies present a somewhat save strategy.
Spiteful motives of players need to be considered and are included in period
two. Nonetheless, in light of theorized selfish preferences, it can be expected
that period two choices are in line with absolute profit maximizing behavior.
3.1 Standard Cournot
This is a straight forward computation of a Cournot model of simultaneous
choices with quantity being the choice variable. Maximization with respect
to quantity will show best replies as a function of the opponent’s quantity
and substitution will yield optimal output quantities for each firm. In this
case both firms start out in symmetry, i.e. they have identical cost functions.
Both firms act in the same duopoly market and both firms sell all output in
the market instantaneously.
max
yti
piti = P
t(Y t)yti − Ct(yti) (9)
max
yti
piti =
(
a− yti − yt−i
)
yti − byti (10)
∂piti
∂yti
= a− 2yti − yt−i − b = 0 (11)
Reaction Functions: Due to symmetry, both firms have the same reaction
function as a function of the other firm’s output.
Rti : y
t
i(y
t
y−i) =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
yt−i (12)
Rt−i : y
t
−i(y
t
i) =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
yti (13)
Optimal Quantities: Substituting one firm’s reaction function into the
reaction function of the other firm, and vice versa, give firms’ optimal output
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quantities in terms of absolute profit maxima.
yti =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
[
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
yti
]
(14)
yti =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
4
(a− b) + 1
4
yti (15)
Absolute profit maximizing strategies in period one are:
y∗ti = y
∗t
−i =
1
3
(a− b) (16)
3.2 Walrasian Strategies
Here, instead of absolute profits, as computer above, maximization of relative
performance is the objective. For the duopoly model this means maximiz-
ing the difference in absolute profits between the two firms. Again, output
quantity is the choice variable used in the maximization problem. There
are a number of reasons why a firm would want to maximize relative prof-
its instead of absolute profits. In this particular model firms’ incentives to
maximize relative profits may come from a firm’s goal to produce at lower-
than-competitor’s cost in the following period or to avoid being ”left behind”
in terms of competitiveness, along the lines of: If I don’t outperform my com-
petition than they may outperform me, and I am not willing to take that risk.
Another important point here is spiteful motives. A firm may lower its own
absolute profit by increasing production if, in turn, it manages to lower the
other firm’s absolute profit even further. Maximum spite is achieved at the
point of maximal relative distance in profits between the firms, i.e. the rela-
tive profit maximum. The analysis is somewhat shorter than under absolute
profit maximizing strategies. This is due to the lack of a reaction function as
a function of the other firm’s output. Here, the maximization problem shows
that optimal output is independent of the other firms output decision.
This result can also be confirmed intuitively. If it is a firm’s goal to achieve
the largest possible difference in profits between itself and its competition,
then it would be at the point where marginal cost equal the price, as no firm
would be able to go lower and not induce negative profits. This, of course,
is also the outcome of perfect competition of zero economic profits or the
Bertrand price competition. Since both firms face the same cost function in
35
period one both firms have equal share in the market at the relative profit
maximum. Thus, in optimum a firm produces half the aggregate market
output that would equate price and marginal cost. This quantity does not
depend on the output of the other firm.
The objective function of the relative profit maximizing firm looks as fol-
lows:
max
yti
piR,ti =
(
a− yti − yt−i
)
yti − byti −
[(
a− yti − yt−i
)
yt−i − byt−i
]
(17)
The superscript R denotes relative profits and will be used in this regard
henceforth.
∂piR,ti
∂yti
= a− 2yti − yt−i − b+ yt−i = 0 (18)
The relative profit maximizing strategies in period one are:
y∗R,ti = y
∗R,t
−i =
1
2
(a− b) (19)
Proving the intuition:
P t(Y t) = a− Y t (20)
MCti =
∂Ct (yti)
∂yti
= b (21)
Equating marginal cost and price:
P t(Y t) = a− Y t = b = MCti (22)
Total market output:
Y t = a− b (23)
Individual output is half the aggregate output:
1
2
Y t = yi =
1
2
(a− b) (24)
This results is equal to that computed under relative profit maximization and
confirms the intuition about the optimal Walrasian output quantity being
independent of that of the other firm’s output in this symmetric model. As
soon as things become asymmetric, the market will no longer be split into
equal shares and thus simply halving the aggregate output will no longer
suffice, as will be seen further on in the analysis.
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3.3 Profit Computations Simultaneous Moves
Now that optimal first period strategies have been determined, one can eas-
ily compute the resulting profits of the different strategy compilations. For
simultaneous moves, four different cases are possible when combining the
above computed strategies, namely:
i. Cournot plays Cournot. This is the most basic form of quantity com-
petition and maximization of absolute profits (Cournot-Nash equilibrium).
The strategy combination yields maximal absolute profits for each firm in
period one, however, it will not give either firm a competitive advantage to
produce at lower than competitor’s cost in the following period. The model
stays symmetric in the second (last) period.
ii. Walras plays Walras. Maximizing relative profits will result in zero
economic profits for both firms. The outcome is identical to that of perfect
competition or Bertrand price competition. Both firms try to get ahead and
build competitive advantage for period 2, however, if both firms follow this
strategy both will earn zero profit and fail in their attempt to build such
a competitive advantage. The model stays symmetric in the second (last)
period.
iii. (iv.) Cournot plays Walras (Walras plays Cournot). Firms enter
the game with different strategies. The relative profit maximizing firm (Wal-
rasian player) will produce more output than the absolute profit maximizing
firm (Cournot player). This leads to lower absolute profits for both firms,
however, the Walrasian player achieves higher absolute profits compared to
the Cournot player. Thus, not only does the Walrasian player outperform
its competition in period one, it also achieves a competitive advantage in
period two, by successfully lowering marginal cost below that of the Cournot
player. In period two the model becomes asymmetric due to the different
cost functions.
i. Cournot plays Cournot
[
1
3
(a− b) , 1
3
(a− b)]
piti = pi
t
−i =
(
a− y∗ti − y∗t−i
)
y∗ti − by∗ti (25)
piti = pi
t
−i =
(
a− 1
3
(a− b)− 1
3
(a− b)
)
1
3
(a− b)− b
(
1
3
(a− b)
)
(26)
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piti = pi
t
−i =
1
9
(a− b)2 (27)
Both firms achieve the same positive absolute profit. This results in the same
decision situation in period two as no firm establishes a cost advantage over
the other.
ii. Walras plays Walras
[
1
2
(a− b) , 1
2
(a− b)]
piti = pi
t
−i =
(
a− y∗R,ti − y∗R,t−i
)
y∗R,ti − by∗R,ti (28)
piti = pi
t
−i =
(
a− 1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
(a− b)
)
1
2
(a− b)− b1
2
(a− b) (29)
Both firms play the same relative profit maximizing strategy. This results
in an absolute profit equal to 0 for both players. Neither firm gains a cost
advantage in period two, the model is still symmetric.
piti = pi
t
−i = 0 (30)
iii. (iv.) Cournot plays Walras (Walras plays Cournot)[
1
3
(a− b) , 1
2
(a− b)]
The Cournot player generates the following profit:
piti = pi
t
−i =
(
a− y∗ti − y∗R,t−i
)
y∗ti − by∗ti (31)
piti =
(
a− 1
3
(a− b)− 1
2
(a− b)
)
1
3
(a− b)− 1
3
(a− b) b (32)
piti =
1
18
(a− b)2 (33)
The Walrasian player’s profits are:
piti = pi
t
−i =
(
a− y∗ti − y∗R,t−i
)
y∗R,ti − by∗R,ti (34)
pit−i =
(
a− 1
3
(a− b)− 1
2
(a− b)
)
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
(a− b) b (35)
pit−i =
1
12
(a− b)2 (36)
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Clearly, the Walrasian player outperforms the Cournot player, albeit, at a
cost to its absolute profits (when compared to the absolute profit maximizing
strategy computed under Cournot plays Cournot).
piti =
1
18
(a− b)2 < 1
12
(a− b)2 = pit−i (37)
The Walrasian player achieves a cost advantage in the next period. The
model changes from a symmetric to an asymmetric one. It makes sense to
assume that the lower marginal cost in period two are brought about by
an investment into, for example, new technologies. This investment on the
other hand lowers the Walrasian player’s period one profit. In order to avoid
changes in the model, I assume that an investment takes place of the following
kind:
I ti =
piti − pit−i
2
∀ piti > pit−i > 0, else I ti = 0 (38)
The outperforming firm (here the Walrasian player) makes an investment
into cost-saving technologies equal to half the size of the difference between
the 2 firms absolute profits, or half the relative profit. This, still, leaves
the Walrasian player with larger profits than its competitor in the current
period. I further assume that the investment is double effective in cost,
meaning that a one dollar investment will trigger a two dollar decrease in
marginal cost. This assumption will leave the model unchanged and adds
some realism (causality) as to why marginal cost are lower in period two:
If: I ti =
piti − pit−i
2
and δt+1i =
I ti
piti
2 (39)
Then: δt+1i =
piti − pit−i
piti
(40)
Here the only investment possible is made by the Walrasian player and equals:
I ti =
1
12
(a− b)2 − 1
18
(a− b)2
2
(41)
I ti =
1
72
(a− b)2 (42)
It follows that the Walrasian player’s true profit (pˆiti) in period one is equal to
its absolute profit minus the investment. This amount is still larger than the
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Cournot player’s profit in period one. The notation pˆi is used to indicate that
this firm’s first period profit has been reduced by an investment. Indirectly
it also indicates that this firm achieved a cost advantage in period two.
pˆiti = pi
t
i − I ti =
1
12
(a− b)2 − 1
72
(a− b)2 (43)
pˆiti =
5
72
(a− b)2 (44)
The investment will result in the following cost reduction (δ). As there exist
only one opportunity to invest into cost saving technologies (after period
one), δ does not require a superscript t. However, for reasons of conformity I
decided to keep the superscript. It also helps identify the respective period.
δt+1i =
I ti
piti
2 (45)
δt+1i =
1
72
(a− b)2
1
12
(a− b)22 (46)
δt+1i =
1
3
(47)
The (period one) Walrasian player’s new cost function in period two is:
Ct+1(yt+1i ) = b(1− δt+1i )yt+1i (48)
Ct+1(yt+1i ) =
2
3
byt+1i (49)
The (period one) Cournot player is left with the same cost function it already
faced in period one, as it was unable to generate a cost advantage on account
of its lower absolute profits.
Ct+1(yt+1i ) = by
t+1
i (50)
3.4 Simultaneous Moves Strategies in Period Two
Optimal quantity choices in period two depend on the outcomes in period
one. For the simultaneous moves model, in case both firms choose the same
strategy in period one, both will face the same symmetric market in period
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two. These outcomes have already been calculated under the symmetric set-
ting of period one, i.e. Cournot plays Cournot, Walras plays Walras, and
Cournot plays Walras (Walras plays Cournot), which is why I include profits
as well. If both firms choose the same strategies in period one, period
two strategies and profits are:
i. Cournot plays Cournot in period two
y∗t+1i = y
∗t+1
−i =
1
3
(a− b) (51)
pit+1i = pi
t+1
−i =
1
9
(a− b)2 (52)
ii. Walras plays Walras in period two
y∗t+1i = y
∗t+1
−i =
1
2
(a− b) (53)
pit+1i = pi
t+1
−i = 0 (54)
iii. (iv.) Cournot plays Walras (Walras plays Walras) in period
two
The Cournot player will play the following strategy and generate the fol-
lowing profit:
y∗t+1i =
1
3
(a− b) (55)
pit+1i =
1
18
(a− b)2 (56)
The Walrasian player will play the following strategy and generates a higher
profit on account of its output being higher:
y∗t+1i =
1
2
(a− b) (57)
pit+1i =
1
12
(a− b)2 (58)
If, however, firms play different strategies in period one, i.e. the Walrasian
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player builds a cost advantage in period two than optimal quantities need
to be computed for period two. The asymmetric model to be considered for
period two strategy computation is build upon Cournot plays Walras or
Walras plays Cournot in period one.
P t+1(Y t+1) = a− Y t+1, where a > 0 and Y t+1 =
2∑
i=1
yt+1i (59)
Ct+1(yt+1i ) = b(1− δt+1i )yt+1i , where (60)
Second period’s cost function for the period one Cournot player is identical
to it’s cost function from period one as the firm was unable to build a cost
advantage:
Ct+1(yt+1i ) = by
t+1
i (61)
Second period’s cost Function for the period one Walrasian player, who
achieves a cost advantage in period two due to a positive relative profit in
period one:
Ct+1(yt+1i ) =
2
3
byt+1i (62)
Consequently, the maximization problem in period two needs to take into
account 2 different cost functions. The period two Cournot model for
the period one Cournot player looks as follows:
max
yt+1i
pit+1i =
(
a− yt+1i − yt+1−i
)
yt+1i − byt+1i (63)
∂pit+1i
∂yt+1i
= a− 2yt+1i − yt+1−i − b = 0 (64)
Period two Reaction Function for the period one Cournot player:
Rt+1i : y
t+1
i (y
t+1
y−i) =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
yt+1−i (65)
The reaction function is identical to that of period one. However, optimal
output quantity will be different due to the other firms cost advantage.
The period two Cournot model for the period one Walrasian player
looks as follows:
max
yt+1−i
pit+1−i =
(
a− yt+1i − yt+1−i
)
yt+1−i −
2
3
byt+1−i (66)
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∂pit+1−i
∂yt+1−i
= a− yt+1i − 2yt+1−i −
2
3
b = 0 (67)
Period two Reaction Function for the period one Walrasian player:
Rt+1−i : y
t+1
−i (y
t+1
i ) =
1
2
(
a− 2
3
b
)
− 1
2
yt+1i (68)
Optimal Quantities: Substituting Rt+1−i into R
t+1
i results in Firm i’s
optimal absolute output in period two:
yt+1i (y
t+1
−i ) =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
[
1
2
(
a− 2
3
b
)
− 1
2
yt+1i
]
(69)
If the period one Cournot player wants to produce an absolute profit maxi-
mizing quantity in period two, she would optimally choose:
y∗t+1i =
1
3
(
a− 4
3
b
)
(70)
If the period one Walrasian player wants to produce an absolute profit max-
imizing quantity in period two, she would optimally choose:
y∗t+1i =
1
3
(
a− 1
3
b
)
(71)
The incentive to maximize relative profits (Walrasian strategies) in period
two can no longer stem from the objective to further lower marginal cost as no
successive period exist. Nonetheless, relative performance cannot simply be
discarded and may play an important role as firms may have spiteful motives,
in that they receive utility purely from the fact that they outperform their
competition. This comes at an expense of lower absolute profits. As in period
one, spiteful behavior reaches its optimum at the relative profit maximizing
quantity. Period one Cournot player’s relative profit maximizing strategy in
period two is equal to that of period one as it is independent of the other
firm’s output and it’s cost function has not changed.
max
yt+1i
piR,t+1i =
(
a− yt+1i − yt+1−i
)
yt+1i − byt+1i −[(
a− yt+1i − yt+1−i
)
yt+1−i −
2
3
byt+1−i
] (72)
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∂pit+1i
∂yt+1i
= a− 2yt+1i − yt+1−i − b+ yt+1−i = 0 (73)
y∗R,t+1i =
1
2
(a− b) (74)
Period one Walrasian player, however, produces a relative profit maximizing
quantity in period two larger than that of period one due to its lower marginal
cost in period two:
max
yt+1i
piR,t+1i =
(
a− yt+1i − yt+1−i
)
yt+1i −
2
3
byt+1i −[(
a− yt+1i − yt+1−i
)
yt+1−i − byt+1−i
] (75)
∂pit+1i
∂yt+1i
= a− yt+1−i − 2yt+1i −
2
3
b+ yt+1−i = 0 (76)
y∗R,t+1i =
1
2
(
a− 2
3
b
)
(77)
3.5 Period Two Profit Computations Simultaneous Moves
All possible strategies for absolute and relative profit maximization for both
periods have been computed. This following part is designed to show all
possible outcomes of first and second period strategies, i.e. aggregate profits.
As mentioned before, there are four possible cases in period one [(Cournot
plays Cournot) , (Walras plays Walras) , (Cournot plays Walras) , (Walras
plays Cournot)]. Each one of these four cases from period one has four
possible outcomes in period two, for a grand total of 16 aggregate profits
after period two. Once these have been established, I use backward induction
to solve the game. There are two cases from period one, which do not require
new computation as they did not result in a model change from symmetry to
asymmetry as no positive relative profits were achieved. For these two cases
from period one, period two outcomes are merely the entire profit vector from
period one (I already included period two outcomes for these cases when I
indicated the respective strategies). Therefore, only 8 outcomes need to be
computed in this section. However, for reasons of completeness, I will also
show the 8 outcomes computed in period one and aggregate over two time
periods. Once all 16 outcomes have been shown I will present them in game
tree form, which allows for a much more concise representation and makes
backward induction relatively easy.
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3.5.1 Case i: Cournot Plays Cournot in Period One
This leaves the model unchanged for period two, which means both firms
are faced with the same maximization problem and results are period one
outcomes, which have already been computed. I use Πi to indicate aggregate
profits.
1. Cournot plays Cournot in period two
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i = 2
(
1
9
(a− b)2
)
=
2
9
(a− b)2 (78)
2. Walras plays Walras in period two
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i =
1
9
(a− b)2 + 0 = 1
9
(a− b)2 (79)
3. Cournot plays Walras in period two
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i =
1
9
(a− b)2 + 1
18
(a− b)2 = 3
18
(a− b)2 (80)
4. Walras plays Cournot in period two
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i =
1
9
(a− b)2 + 1
12
(a− b)2 = 7
36
(a− b)2 (81)
3.5.2 Case ii: Walras Plays Walras in Period One
This also leaves the model unchanged for period two and both firms face the
same maximization problem and results are period one outcomes, these have
also been computed before.
5. Cournot plays Cournot in period two
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i = 0 +
1
9
(a− b)2 = 1
9
(a− b)2 (82)
6. Walras plays Walras in period two
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i = 0 (83)
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7. Cournot plays Walras in period two
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i = 0 +
1
18
(a− b)2 = 1
18
(a− b)2 (84)
8. Walras plays Cournot in period two
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i = 0 +
1
12
(a− b)2 = 1
12
(a− b)2 (85)
3.5.3 Case iii: Cournot plays Walras in Period One
This case requires computation of period two outcomes, using the strategies
calculated in the asymmetric period two game.
9. Cournot Plays Cournot in Period Two
One might have an intuition about the importance of ’Cournot plays Cournot’
in period two as there is no following period. Any behavior deviating from
a strict absolute profit maximizing behavior must lie within other-regarding
preferences. If there is no next period and, thus, no opportunity to further
lower cost and further build competitive advantage, and this is known to all
players, then playing Cournot strategies seem to be the only rational thing
to do. However, in light of spiteful motive, one must not underestimate the
power of relative profit maximizing strategies.
Period one Cournot player achieves the following period two and aggregate
profit:
pit+1i =
[
a− (y∗t+1i )− (y∗t+1−i )] (y∗t+1i )− b (y∗t+1i ) (86)
pit+1i =
[
a− 1
3
(
a− 4
3
b
)
− 1
3
(
a− 1
3
b
)]
1
3
(
a− 4
3
b
)
−
1
3
(
a− 4
3
b
)
b
(87)
pit+1i =
1
9
(
a− 4
3
b
)2
(88)
This says, that the period one Cournot playing firm, while it’s opponent
plays Walras in period one, will have an absolute profit maximum in period
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two, when both firms choose absolute maximizing strategies in period two,
of 1
9
(
a− 4
3
b
)2
. Thus, aggregation over 2 periods yields:
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i =
1
18
(a− b)2 + 1
9
(
a− 4
3
b
)2
=
1
6
a2 − 11
27
ab+
41
162
b2 (89)
10. Walras plays Walras in period two
Period one Cournot player achieves the following period two profit:
pit+1i =
[
a−
(
y∗R,t+1i
)
−
(
y∗R,t+1−i
)](
y∗R,t+1i
)
− b
(
y∗R,t+1i
)
(90)
pit+1i =
[
a− 1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
(
a− 2
3
b
)]
1
2
(a− b)−
1
2
(a− b) b
(91)
pit+1i =
1
12
(
b2 − ab) (92)
Period one Cournot playing firm, while it’s opponent plays Walras in period
one, will have a relative profit maximum in period two, when both firms
play their relative profit maximizing strategy in period two, of 1
12
(b2 − ab).
Aggregation over 2 periods yields:
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i =
1
18
(a− b)2 + 1
12
(
b2 − ab) = 1
18
a2 − 7
36
ab+
5
36
b2 (93)
11. Cournot plays Walras in period two
Period one Cournot player achieves the following period two profit:
pit+1i =
[
a− (y∗t+1i )− (y∗R,t+1−i )] (y∗t+1i )− b (y∗t+1i ) (94)
pit+1i =
[
a− 1
3
(
a− 4
3
b
)
− 1
2
(
a− 2
3
b
)]
1
3
(
a− 4
3
b
)
−
1
3
(
a− 4
3
b
)
b
(95)
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pit+1i =
1
18
a2 − 4
27
ab+
8
81
b2 (96)
Period one Cournot playing firm, while it’s opponent plays Walras in period
one, will make a profit in period two, given it plays Cournot while it’s oppo-
nent plays Walras in period two, of 1
18
a2 − 4
27
ab + 8
81
b2. Aggregation over 2
periods yields:
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i =
1
18
(a− b)2 + 1
18
a2 − 4
27
ab+
8
81
b2 =
1
9
a2 − 7
27
ab+
25
162
b2
(97)
12. Walras plays Cournot in period two
Period one Cournot player achieves the following period two profit:
pit+1i =
[
a−
(
y∗R,t+1i
)
− (y∗t+1−i )] (y∗R,t+1i )− b(y∗R,t+1i ) (98)
pit+1i =
[
a− 1
2
(a− b)− 1
3
(
a− 1
3
b
)]
1
2
(a− b)−
1
2
(a− b) b
(99)
pit+1i =
1
12
a2 − 5
18
ab+
7
36
b2 (100)
Period one Cournot playing firm, while it’s opponent plays Walras in period
one, will make a profit in period two, given its strategy is relative profit
maximization in period two while it’s opponent’s strategy is characterized by
absolute profit maximization in period two, of 1
12
a2− 5
18
ab+ 7
36
b2. Aggregation
over 2 periods yields:
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i =
1
18
(a− b)2 + 1
12
a2 − 5
18
ab+
7
36
b2 =
5
36
a2 − 7
18
ab+
1
4
b2
(101)
3.5.4 Case iv: Walras plays Cournot in Period One
This case is case iii. in reversed order, i.e. in case iv., case iii. outcomes are
the opponent’s outcomes, which in turn means that case iv. outcomes are
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the outcomes of the opponent in case iii. The following are the computations
for a period one Walrasian player while its competitor chose to be a Cournot
player in period one. There are, again, 4 possible outcomes:
13. Cournot plays Cournot in period two
Period one Walrasian player achieves the following period two profit:
pit+1i =
[
a− (y∗t+1i )− (y∗t+1−i )] (y∗t+1i )− 23b (y∗t+1i ) (102)
pit+1i =
[
a− 1
3
(
a− 1
3
b
)
− 1
3
(
a− 4
3
b
)]
1
3
(
a− 1
3
b
)
−
1
3
(
a− 1
3
b
)
2
3
b
(103)
pit+1i =
(
1
3
a− 1
9
b
)2
(104)
This says, that the period one Walras playing firm, while it’s opponent plays
Cournot in period one, will have an absolute profit maximum in period two,
when both firms play absolute profit maximizing strategies in period two, of(
1
3
a− 1
9
b
)2
. Thus, aggregation over 2 periods yields:
Πi = pˆi
t
−i + pi
t+1
i =
5
72
(a− b)2 +
(
1
3
a− 1
9
b
)2
=
13
72
a2 − 23
108
ab+
53
648
b2
(105)
14. Walras plays Walras in period two
Period one Walrasian player achieves the following period two profit:
pit+1i =
[
a−
(
y∗R,t+1i
)
−
(
y∗R,t+1−i
)](
y∗R,t+1i
)
− 2
3
b
(
y∗R,t+1i
)
(106)
pit+1i =
[
a− 1
2
(
a− 2
3
b
)
− 1
2
(a− b)
]
1
2
(
a− 2
3
b
)
−
1
2
(
a− 2
3
b
)
2
3
b
(107)
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pit+1i =
1
12
ab− 1
18
b2 (108)
The period one Walras playing firm, while it’s opponent plays Cournot in
period one, will achieve profits in period two, when both firms maximize
relative profits in period two, of 1
12
ab − 1
18
b2. Aggregation over 2 periods
yields:
Πi = pˆi
t
−i + pi
t+1
i =
5
72
(a− b)2 + 1
12
ab− 1
18
b2 =
5
72
a2 − 1
18
ab+
1
72
b2
(109)
15. Cournot plays Walras in period two
Period one Walrasian player achieves the following period two profit:
pit+1i =
[
a− (y∗t+1i )− (y∗R,t+1−i )] (y∗t+1i )− 23b (y∗t+1i ) (110)
pit+1i =
[
a− 1
3
(
a− 1
3
b
)
− 1
2
(a− b)
]
1
3
(
a− 1
3
b
)
−
1
3
(
a− 1
3
b
)
2
3
b
(111)
pit+1i =
1
18
a2 − 1
27
ab+
1
162
b2 (112)
Period one Walras playing firm, while it’s opponent plays Cournot in period
one, will achieve profits in period two, given it plays Cournot strategies in
period two while it’s opponent plays Walrasian strategies in period two, of
1
18
a2 − 1
27
ab+ 1
162
b2. Aggregation over 2 periods yields:
Πi = pˆi
t
−i + pi
t+1
i =
5
72
(a− b)2 + 1
18
a2 − 1
27
ab+
1
162
b2 =
1
8
a2 − 19
108
ab+
49
648
b2
(113)
16. Walras plays Cournot in period two
Period one Walrasian player achieves the following period two profit:
pit+1i =
[
a−
(
y∗R,t+1i
)
− (y∗t+1−i )] (y∗R,t+1i )− 23b(y∗R,t+1i ) (114)
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pit+1i =
[
a− 1
2
(
a− 2
3
b
)
− 1
3
(
a− 4
3
b
)]
1
2
(
a− 2
3
b
)
−
1
2
(
a− 2
3
b
)
2
3
b
(115)
pit+1i =
1
12
a2 − 1
27
b2 (116)
The period one Walras playing firm, while it’s opponent plays Cournot in
period one, will make a profit in period two, given that it plays a Walrasian
strategy in period two while its opponent plays a Cournot strategy in period
two, of 1
12
a2 − 1
27
b2. Aggregation over 2 periods yields:
Πi = pˆi
t
−i + pi
t+1
i =
5
72
(a− b)2 + 1
12
a2 − 1
27
b2 =
11
72
a2 − 5
36
ab+
7
216
b2
(117)
3.6 Sequential Moves: Absolute Stackelberg
Optimal quantities are found through backward induction. Contrary to the
previously analyzed simultaneous moves game, the sequential moves model
reveals the first movers choices to the second mover. This, however, is known
to the first mover, and she is able to include this information in her deci-
sion, as she knows how the second mover will react to her choice. Thus,
the sequential moves game is one where information is common knowledge.
Backward induction analysis starts with the reaction function of the second
mover, which is equal to that of the Cournot reaction function computed
early on in the simultaneous moves game. This reaction function is then
substituted directly into the first mover’s profit function. This process is
straight forward, if the second mover can perfectly observe the quantity pro-
duced by the first mover, and the first mover knows exactly how the second
mover will react to it’s produced quantity, then the first mover can simply
include this information into it’s objective function and maximize it. The
terminology in the Stackelberg model names the first mover ”leader” and
the second mover ”follower.” The terminology will be used interchangeably
henceforth. In the following I use the subscript i for the leader and −i for the
follower. Often times it will not be necessary to make this distinction, as seen
previously under simultaneous moves, however, due to the sequential nature
of the game, it will help keep structure. I use absolute Stackelberg to indicate
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the absolute profit maximizing motivation of the players and in the following
subsection relative Stackelberg to mean that firms choose strategies following
a relative profit maximizing course. All the same basic assumptions about
the duopoly market, as considered under simultaneous decision making, hold.
The follower’s reaction function (equals the Cournot reaction function of
simultaneous moves):
Rt−i : y
t
−i(y
t
i) =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
yti (118)
The follower’s reaction function will be substituted directly into the leader’s
profit function:
max
yti
piti =
[
a− yti −
(
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
yti
)]
yti − byti (119)
∂piti
∂yti
= a− 2yti −
1
2
(a− b) + yti − b = 0 (120)
The first mover’s absolute profit maximizing strategy in period one equals:
y∗ti =
1
2
(a− b) (121)
The Follower’s optimal reaction to the leader’s output is:
Rt−i : y
t
−i(y
∗t
i ) =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
(
1
2
(a− b)
)
(122)
y∗t−i =
1
4
(a− b) (123)
3.7 Sequential Moves: Relative Stackelberg
Relative Stackelberg, just as absolute Stackelberg, is computed backwards.
The follower’s reaction function is identical to that computed under Wal-
rasian relative profit maximization (simultaneous moves) and independent
of the first mover’s output quantity. Due to this independence, common
knowledge does not affect outcomes, as it did with absolute Stackelberg, and
neither firm could ”care less” about the information brought about by the
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sequential nature of the game. The second mover’s optimal output is sub-
stituted into the first mover’s profit function in order to compute the first
mover’s strategy. However, does the leader really need this information to
maximize its relative profit? The answer is no! Just as the follower’s opti-
mal output quantity is independent of that of the leader, so is the leader’s
decision about its own optimal relative profit maximizing quantity. The com-
putation below shows that when substituting the follower’s optimal quantity
into the leader’s profit function, the leader chooses the same quantity as seen
under Walrasian relative profit maximization and, in this case, also, as un-
der absolute Stackelberg. The leader will always choose to produce 1
2
(a− b),
irrespective of whether it’s motives are of absolute profit maximizing or rel-
ative profit maximizing nature, and the outcome of this sequential game in
period one depends solely on the follower’s decision to maximize absolute or
relative profits.
The second mover’s optimal output (equal to the Walrasian output in the
simultaneous moves game) is:
max
yt−i
piR,t−i =
(
a− yti − yt−i
)
yt−i − byt−i −
[(
a− yti − yt−i
)
yti − byti
]
(124)
∂piR,t−i
∂yt−i
= a− 2yt−i − yti − b+ yti = 0 (125)
The second mover’s relative profit maximizing strategy in period one is in-
dependent of the leader’s choice and equals:
y∗R,t−i =
1
2
(a− b) (126)
The first mover’s relative profit function is:
max
yti
piR,ti =
(
a− yti − yt−i
)
yti − byti −
[(
a− yti − yt−i
)
yt−i − byt−i
]
(127)
Substitution of the second mover’s optimal output into the first mover’s
objective function yields:
max
yti
piR,ti =
(
a− yti −
1
2
(a− b)
)
yti − byti−[(
a− yti −
1
2
(a− b)
)
1
2
(a− b)− b1
2
(a− b)
] (128)
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∂piR,ti
∂yti
= a− 2yti −
1
2
(a− b)− b+ 1
2
(a− b) = 0 (129)
The second mover’s quantity cancels out and the function is independent of
the second mover’s output. This is the outcome under Walrasian competition
and confirms the earlier conjecture that common knowledge in this sequen-
tial relative moves game does not change the outcome due to the reaction
function’s independence of the opponent’s choice. The first mover’s relative
profit maximizing strategy in period one is independent of the second mover’s
choice and equals:
y∗R,ti =
1
2
(a− b) (130)
Now that sequential moves strategies in period one have been computed, I will
continue and analyze the two resulting cases, i.e. the absolute (or relative)
profit maximizing first mover plays the absolute profit maximizing second
mover and the absolute (or relative) profit maximizing first mover plays the
relative profit maximizing second mover. As the first mover will always play
1
2
(a − b) in period one, there is no distinguishing, in terms of quantity, as
to what motivated the first mover to choose this particular strategy. As
soon as the model turns asymmetric though, absolute and relative profit
maximizing strategies will no longer share the same output level, as will
be seen in the further analysis. As mentioned, the outcome in this first
period will only depend on the quantity decision of the second mover, another
characteristic lost as soon as the model turns asymmetric. I continue by
computing outcomes in period one brought about by the 2 cases of period
one.
3.8 Profit Computations Sequential Moves
From the above computations optimal quantity choices were derived. For the
sequential moves game only 2 strategy combinations exist. The outcomes of
these two combinations depend only on the adopted strategy of the second
mover, as the first mover’s choice will always be 1
2
(a− b). Therefore, the 2
cases are:
i. Stackelberg leader plays absolute profit maximizing Stackelberg
follower This is the standard Stackelberg model where both players’ objec-
tive is absolute profit maximization (as mentioned before, for the leader it
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makes no difference, in terms of output, if absolute or relative profit max-
imization is the objective). As opposed to simultaneous moves, sequential
moves will result in different profits for the firms if both firms maximize ab-
solute profits. This also means that the leader will generate a cost advantage
in period two while the follower is left with the same cost function as in pe-
riod one. In period two the model becomes asymmetric due to the different
cost functions and, for the leader, absolute and relative profit maximizing
strategies are no longer identical in terms of quantity.
ii. Stackelberg leader plays relative profit maximizing Stackelberg
follower The model’s outcome is different from i., as determined by the
second mover’s choice to maximize relative profits. Both firms produce the
same output and achieve the same zero profit outcome, due to symmetry
in the first period and the fact that optimal choices are independent of the
other firms output. The model stays symmetric in the second (last) period.
One might wonder about the follower’s preference to play a relative profit
maximizing strategy, as there is no way it could result in a desirable cost
advantage in period two and profits in period one are lower than under an
absolute profit maximizing strategy. However, it may be the second mover’s
intend to prevent such a cost advantage for the first mover and by selecting a
relative profit maximizing strategy the second mover erases the first movers
advantage in period two. Further considerations may include punishment of
the leader for gaining an ”unfair” cost advantage in period two and inequal-
ity aversion of the follower may provide the motive to choose a relative profit
maximum in period one, as selecting the same quantity as the first mover
will drive profits for both firms to zero.
i. Stackelberg leader plays absolute profit maximizing Stackel-
berg follower
[
1
2
(a− b) , 1
4
(a− b)]
The leader’s profits in period one:
piti =
[
a− (y∗ti )− (y∗t−i)] (y∗ti )− b (y∗ti ) (131)
piti =
(
a− 1
2
(a− b)− 1
4
(a− b)
)
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
(a− b) b (132)
piti =
1
8
(a− b)2 (133)
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The follower’s profit in period one:
pit−i =
[
a− (y∗ti )− (y∗t−i)] (y∗t−i)− b (y∗t−i) (134)
pit−i =
(
a− 1
2
(a− b)− 1
4
(a− b)
)
1
4
(a− b)− 1
4
(a− b) b (135)
pit−i =
1
16
(a− b)2 (136)
As the first mover’s output is twice that of the second mover, and both firms
face the same market price, and all output is sold in the market, the first
mover’s profit is double that of the second mover. The first mover’s positive
relative profit results in an investment into cost-saving technologies, which
successfully lowers marginal cost in period two. The investment undertaken
by the firm is equal to:
I ti =
piti − pit−i
2
(137)
I ti =
1
8
(a− b)2 − 1
16
(a− b)2
2
(138)
I ti =
1
32
(a− b)2 (139)
Given the investment of the first mover into cost-saving technologies, thereby
reducing marginal cost in period two, the true profit of the first mover in
period one (pˆi) is the absolute profit computed above minus the investment:
pˆiti = pi
t
i − I ti =
1
8
(a− b)2 − 1
32
(a− b)2 (140)
pˆiti =
3
32
(a− b)2 (141)
The investment will lead to the following cost reduction (δ):
δi =
I ti
piti
2 (142)
δi =
1
32
(a− b)2
1
8
(a− b)2 2 (143)
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δ−i =
1
2
(144)
The leader’s new cost function in period two is:
Ct+1(yt+1i ) = b(1− δi)yt+1i (145)
Ct+1(yt+1i ) =
1
2
byt+1i (146)
The follower’s cost function in period two remains to be:
Ct+1(yt+1−i ) = by
t+1
−i (147)
ii. Stackelberg leader plays relative profit maximizing Stackel-
berg follower
[
1
2
(a− b) , 1
2
(a− b)]
The leader’s profit in period one, which is equal to that of the follower,
as both firms play the same quantity, i.e. 1
2
(a− b), is:
piti =
[
a−
(
y∗R,ti
)
−
(
y∗R,t−i
)](
y∗R,ti
)
− b
(
y∗R,ti
)
(148)
The superscript R for the first mover’s strategy is rather unnecessary as there
is no difference in quantity between absolute and relative profit maximizing
strategies. I am using it here to highlight that the 2 different strategies have
the same quantity.
piti = pi
t
−i =
(
a− 1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
(a− b)
)
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
(a− b) b (149)
piti = pi
t
−i = 0 (150)
There exist no opportunity for either firm to lower marginal cost for period
two.
3.9 Sequential Moves Strategies in Period Two
As with the simultaneous moves game, optimal quantity choices in period
two depend on the outcomes in period one. In case the second mover sets
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out to maximize relative profits in period one, both firms face the same cost
function in period two and, thus, the same maximization problem in period
two. In case the second mover maximizes absolute profits in period one,
the first mover establishes a competitive advantage in period two, i.e. lower
marginal costs, while the follower has to optimize period two with period
one’s cost function. It follows that if the second mover maximizes relative
profits in period one, both end up with the same strategies and profits in
period two that they had in period one, and outcomes, just as in period one,
are determined solely by the follower’s choice to either maximize absolute or
relative profit. If the second mover plays a relative profit maximizing
strategy, the model stays symmetric in period two and outcomes consist of
period one outcomes:
i. Stackelberg leader plays absolute profit maximizing Stackel-
berg follower in period two
y∗t+1i =
1
2
(a− b) (151)
pit+1i =
1
8
(a− b)2 (152)
y∗t+1−i =
1
4
(a− b) (153)
pit+1−i =
1
16
(a− b)2 (154)
ii. Stackelberg leader plays relative profit maximizing Stackel-
berg follower in period two
y∗R,t+1i = y
∗R,t+1
−i =
1
2
(a− b) (155)
pit+1i = pi
t+1
−i = 0 (156)
Asymmetry in period two can only be created if the second mover chooses
to play absolute profit maximizing strategies in period one, i.e. the
standard Stackelberg model. The model to be considered in period two is:
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Inverse demand:
P t+1(Y t+1) = a− Y t+1 (157)
Second period’s cost function for the first mover:
Ct+1(yt+1i ) =
1
2
byt+1i (158)
Second period’s cost function for the second mover:
Ct+1(yt+1−i ) = by
t+1
−i (159)
Taking the first mover’s reduced cost into account, absolute profit maximiz-
ing strategies in period two, given a resulting asymmetric setting from period
one, shows the following strategies for the leader and follower:
The second mover’s reaction function (equal to Cournot) is:
Rt+1−i : y
t+1
−i (y
t+1
i ) =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
yt+1i (160)
Substitution into the first mover’s profit function yields:
max
yt+1i
pit+1i =
[
a− (yt+1i )− (yt+1−i )] (yt+1i )− 12b (yt+1i ) (161)
max
yt+1i
pit+1i =
[
a− (yt+1i )− (12 (a− b)− 12yt+1i
)] (
yt+1i
)− 1
2
b
(
yt+1i
)
(162)
∂pit+1i
∂yt+1i
= a− 2yt+1i −
1
2
(a− b) + yt+1i −
1
2
b = 0 (163)
y∗t+1i =
1
2
a (164)
The second mover’s optimal quantity in period two is:
Rt+1−i : y
t+1
−i (y
∗t+1
i ) =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
4
a (165)
y∗t+1−i =
1
4
a− 1
2
b (166)
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Relative profit maximizing quantities in period two, considering the first
mover’s lower cost function and contrary to the symmetric model in period
one, will result in in a difference between absolute and relative profit maxi-
mizing strategies for the first mover.
The follower’s output (equal to Walras) does not change as it’s cost func-
tion is the same as it was in period one:
y∗R,t+1−i =
1
2
(a− b) (167)
Substitution into the leader’s profit function yields:
max
yt+1i
piR,t+1i =
[
a− (yt+1i )− (y∗R,t+1−i )] (yt+1i )− 12b (yt+1i )−[(
a− (yt+1i )− (y∗R,t+1−i ))(y∗R,t+1−i )− b(y∗R,t+1−i )] (168)
max
yt+1i
piR,t+1i =
(
a− (yt+1i )− 12 (a− b)
)(
yt+1i
)− 1
2
b
(
yt+1i
)−[(
a− (yt+1i )− 12 (a− b)
)
1
2
(a− b)− b1
2
(a− b)
] (169)
∂piR,t+1i
∂yt+1i
= a− 2yt+1i −
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
b+
1
2
(a− b) = 0 (170)
y∗R,t+1i =
1
2
a− 1
4
b (171)
There is one more strategy that needs to be considered here, which is clearly
distinguished from the strategies under simultaneous moves. Due to common
knowledge, i.e. the follower’s ability to observe the the leader’s quantity, the
follower can choose to play an absolute profit maximizing strategy given
the leader played a relative profit maximizing strategy (which in this case
is clearly distinct from its absolute profit maximizing quantity, contrary to
period one). In this particular case, the absolute profit maximizing strat-
egy is not equal to that computed above, where both firms choose to be
absolute profit maximizers. The follower includes the leaders relative profit
maximizing quantity in her reaction function and optimally reacts as follows:
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The leader’s relative profit maximizing quantity in period two is:
y∗R,t+1i =
1
2
a− 1
4
b (172)
The follower’s reaction function (equal to Cournot) is:
Rt+1−i : y
t+1
−i (y
∗R,t+1
i ) =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
y∗R,t+1i (173)
yt+1−i (y
∗R,t+1
i ) =
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
(
1
2
a− 1
4
b
)
(174)
The follower’s optimal absolute profit maximizing reply to the leader’s rela-
tive profit maximizing quantity is:
y∗t+1−i =
1
4
a− 3
8
b (175)
3.10 Period Two Profit Computations Sequential Moves
Strategies for period two have been computed and, in order to finish the
preparatory steps for the backward induction analysis, outcomes in period
two are computed in this subsection, and, along with the results obtained
in period one, aggregated. Just as under simultaneous moves, sequential
moves outcomes in period two depend on the choices of period one (cases
of period one). Therefore, all computations below are based on a certain
outcome of period one and labeled as such. Contrary to simultaneous moves,
the sequential moves model has only 2 outcomes resulting from period one.
If both firms choose relative profit maximizing strategies, period two model
is equal to period one model with 2 outcomes in period two. If both firms
behave in accordance with the absolute profit maximizing model (absolute
Stackelberg), thus, establishing a difference in the two firms’ cost functions in
period two, firms now have 4 possible outcome in period two to consider. This
makes for a total of 6 outcomes that need to be analyzed through backward
induction.
3.10.1 Case 1. Stackelberg Leader Plays Relative Profit Maxi-
mizing Stackelberg Follower in Period One
Neither firm creates a cost advantages in period two, which means, both firms
face the same maximization problem in period two that they did in period
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one and outcomes in period two must therefore reflect outcomes of period
one.
1. Stackelberg leader plays absolute profit maximizing Stackel-
berg follower in period two
Results for the Leader:
pit+1i =
1
8
(a− b)2 (176)
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
i = 0 +
1
8
(a− b)2 = 1
8
(a− b)2 (177)
Results for the follower:
pit+1−i =
1
16
(a− b)2 (178)
Π−i = pit−i + pi
t+1
−i = 0 +
1
16
(a− b)2 = 1
16
(a− b)2 (179)
2. Stackelberg leader plays relative profit maximizing Stackel-
berg follower in period two
Results for the leader and follower :
pit+1i = pi
t+1
−i = 0 (180)
Πi = pi
t
i + pi
t+1
−i = 0 + 0 = 0 (181)
3.10.2 Case 2. Stackelberg Leader Plays Absolute Profit Maxi-
mizing Stackelberg Follower in Period One
The first mover outperforms the second mover in period one, which leads to a
cost advantage for the first mover over the second mover in period two. The
market is no longer equally split and absolute and relative profit maximizing
strategies no longer align for the first mover.
3. Absolute profit maximizing Stackelberg leader plays absolute
profit maximizing Stackelberg follower in period two
Results for the Leader:
pit+1i =
[
a− (y∗t+1i )− (y∗t+1−i )] (y∗t+1i )− 12b (y∗t+1i ) (182)
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pit+1i =
[
a− 1
2
a−
(
1
4
a− 1
2
b
)](
1
2
a
)
− 1
2
b
1
2
a (183)
pit+1i =
1
8
a2 (184)
Aggregation over 2 periods yields:
Πi = pˆi
t
i + pi
t+1
i =
3
32
(a− b)2 + 1
8
a2 =
7
32
a2 − 3
16
ab+
3
32
b2 (185)
Results for the follower:
pit+1−i =
[
a− (y∗t+1i )− (y∗t+1−i )] (y∗t+1−i )− b (y∗t+1−i ) (186)
pit+1−i =
[
a− 1
2
a−
(
1
4
a− 1
2
b
)](
1
4
a− 1
2
b
)
−
(
1
4
a− 1
2
)
b (187)
pit+1−i =
(
1
4
a− 1
2
b
)2
(188)
Aggregation over 2 periods:
Π−i = pit−i + pi
t+1
−i =
1
16
(a− b)2 +
(
1
4
a− 1
2
b
)2
=
1
8
a2 − 3
8
ab+
5
16
b2 (189)
4. Relative profit maximizing Stackelberg leader plays relative
profit maximizing Stackelberg follower in period two
Once again, as under simultaneous moves, playing relative profit maximiz-
ing strategies in period two must stem from other-regarding preferences as,
in terms of pure profit seeking agents, no better quantity than the absolute
profit maximizing quantity exists.
Results for the Leader:
pit+1i =
[
a−
(
y∗R,t+1i
)
−
(
y∗R,t+1−i
)](
y∗R,t+1i
)
− 1
2
b
(
y∗R,t+1i
)
(190)
pit+1i =
[
a−
(
1
2
a− 1
4
b
)
− 1
2
(a− b)
](
1
2
a− 1
4
b
)
− 1
2
b
(
1
2
a− 1
4
b
)
(191)
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pit+1i =
1
8
ab− 1
16
b2 (192)
Aggregation over 2 periods:
Πi = pˆi
t
i + pi
t+1
i =
3
32
(a− b)2 + 1
8
ab− 1
16
b2 =
3
32
a2 − 1
16
ab+
1
32
b2 (193)
Results for the follower:
pit+1−i =
[
a−
(
y∗R,t+1i
)
−
(
y∗R,t+1−i
)](
y∗R,t+1−i
)
− b
(
y∗R,t+1−i
)
(194)
pit+1−i =
[
a−
(
1
2
a− 1
4
b
)
− 1
2
(a− b)
]
1
2
(a− b)− 1
2
(a− b) b (195)
pit+1−i =
1
8
b2 − 1
8
ab (196)
Aggregation over 2 periods:
Π−i = pit−i + pi
t+1
−i =
1
16
(a− b)2 + 1
8
b2 − 1
8
ab =
1
16
a2 − 1
4
ab+
3
16
b2 (197)
5. Absolute profit maximizing Stackelberg leader plays relative
profit maximizing Stackelberg follower in period two
Results for the Leader:
pit+1i =
[
a− (y∗t+1i )− (y∗R,t+1−i )] (y∗t+1i )− 12b (y∗t+1i ) (198)
pit+1i =
[
a− 1
2
a− 1
2
(a− b)
]
1
2
a− 1
2
b
(
1
2
a
)
(199)
pit+1i = 0 (200)
Aggregation over 2 periods:
Πi = pˆi
t
i + pi
t+1
i =
3
32
(a− b)2 + 0 = 3
32
(a− b)2 (201)
Results for the follower:
pit+1−i =
[
a− (y∗t+1i )− (y∗R,t+1−i )](y∗R,t+1−i )− b(y∗R,t+1−i ) (202)
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pit+1−i =
[
a− 1
2
a− 1
2
(a− b)
]
1
2
(a− b)− b
(
1
2
(a− b)
)
(203)
pit+1−i =
1
4
b2 − 1
4
ab (204)
Aggregation over 2 periods:
Π−i = pit−i + pi
t+1
−i =
1
16
(a− b) + 1
4
b2 − 1
4
ab =
1
16
a2 − 3
8
ab+
5
16
b2 (205)
6. Relative profit maximizing Stackelberg leader plays absolute
profit maximizing Stackelberg follower in period two
Results for the Leader:
pit+1i =
[
a−
(
y∗R,t+1i
)
− (y∗t+1−i )] (y∗R,t+1i )− 12b(y∗R,t+1i ) (206)
pit+1i =
[
a−
(
1
2
a− 1
4
b
)
−
(
1
4
a− 3
8
b
)](
1
2
a− 1
4
b
)
−
1
2
b
(
1
2
a− 1
4
b
) (207)
pit+1i =
1
8
a2 − 1
32
b2 (208)
Aggregation over 2 periods:
Πi = pˆi
t
i + pi
t+1
i =
3
32
(a− b)2 + 1
8
a2 − 1
32
b2 =
7
32
a2 − 3
16
ab+
1
16
b2 (209)
Results for the follower:
pit+1−i =
[
a−
(
y∗R,t+1i
)
− (y∗t+1−i )] (y∗t+1−i )− b (y∗t+1−i ) (210)
pit+1−i =
[
a−
(
1
2
a− 1
4
b
)
−
(
1
4
a− 3
8
b
)](
1
4
a− 3
8
b
)
− b
(
1
4
a− 3
8
b
)
(211)
pit+1−i =
(
1
4
a− 3
8
b
)2
(212)
Aggregation over 2 periods:
Π−i = pit−i + pi
t+1
−i =
1
16
(a− b) +
(
1
4
a− 3
8
b
)2
=
1
8
a2 − 5
16
ab+
13
64
b2 (213)
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3.11 Backward Induction - Finding the Nash Equilib-
ria
Now that all strategies and outcomes have been computed, its time to find
the Nash equilibria to obtain a theoretical solution to both the simultane-
ous and sequential moves games. I therefore present both games in game
tree form, which also allows for a convenient overview of all strategies and
aggregated outcome previously computed, and then use backward induc-
tion to derive the Nash equilibria. Although the games are, mathematically
speaking, rather straight forward, they are also somewhat tedious, due their
dynamic character, and its easy to get lost within the games. I show that for
the simultaneous moves game 2 asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies
exist and that the mixed strategy equilibrium yields an expected payoff of:
Πi = Π−i =
75
389
a2 − 367
991
ab+
82
431
b2 (214)
The sequential moves game is much more straight forward and one sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists at absolute profit maximiz-
ing Stackelberg throughout. Consequently, the first mover establishes a cost
advantage in period two turning the game asymmetric. The lower marginal
cost in period two also creates a scenario where a relative profit maximizing
strategy for the first mover in period two is smaller than the absolute profit
maximizing strategy in period two. While in the symmetric model relative
profit maximizing strategies usually means increasing output beyond the ab-
solute optimum, here, the first mover can use its substantial cost advantage
and actually lower output below the absolute profit maximizing quantity, us-
ing it’s competitive advantage to create an even larger distance between itself
and its competition. Another interesting aspect about this model is that if
the first mover did establish a cost advantage in period two and chooses
dominant absolute profit maximizing strategy in period two, than a rela-
tive profit maximizing Stackelberg follower, albeit not a dominant strategy,
will actually generate negative profits. The outcomes in equilibrium for the
sequential moves games are:
Πi =
7
32
a2 − 3
16
ab+
3
32
b2 (215)
Π−i =
1
8
a2 − 3
8
ab+
5
16
b2 (216)
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Overall, the equilibrium quantity in the sequential moves game is larger than
the mixed or pure strategy equilibria in the simultaneous moves game, ren-
dering the sequential moves game more efficient in terms of total welfare.
3.11.1 Game Tree: Simultaneous Moves
The game tree (figure 1) can easily be solved with backward induction. How-
ever, one needs to account for imperfect information due to the simultaneous
move nature of the game. In period two both players choose Cournot strate-
gies and the restriction to perfectly identify the opponent’s choice (imperfect
information) does not limit the players in their decision to choose Cournot
as it is always the dominant strategy. Thus, the game can be reduced to a
one period game (figure 2 and table 1) when adding period two result to the
outcomes of the game in period one. This result can also be confirmed intu-
itively: If no successive period exists and therefore no incentives are provided
to further lower cost by outperforming competition, then it seems reasonable
to assume that firms play Cournot strategies in the last period maximizing
absolute profits. This, however, does not consider spiteful motives. In the
presence of spite a relative profit maximizing strategy may still prevail de-
spite a no-future scenario. The notation means: C (Cournot strategy) and
W (Walrasian strategy)
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firm−i
firmi
firm−i
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(a− b)2 , 7
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1
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1
3
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3
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Figure 1: Game tree Cournot game
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firmi
firm−i
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ab+ 53
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9
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[
1
3
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1
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1
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W
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Figure 2: Reduced game tree Cournot game
Walras
[
1
2
(a− b)] Cournot[ 1
3
(a− b)]
Walras
[
1
2
(a− b)] 1
9
(a− b)2 , 1
9
(a− b)2 13
72
a2 − 23
108
ab+ 53
648
b2, 1
6
a2 − 11
27
ab+ 41
162
b2
Cournot
[
1
3
(a− b)] 1
6
a2 − 11
27
ab+ 41
162
b2, 13
72
a2 − 23
108
ab+ 53
648
b2 2
9
(a− b)2 , 2
9
(a− b)2 4
Table 1: Strategic Form of the reduced game tree (Cournot game)
Both extensive and strategic form show two asymmetric sub-game perfect
Nash equilibria at [Walras, Cournot] and [Cournot, Walras]. In the extensive
form (game tree), the equilibrium path is highlighted in red. The strategic
form (two by two table) shows both equilibria at (up-right, down-left). Un-
fortunately, due to the asymmetric character of the 2 Nash equilibria, neither
firm can be sure about which equilibrium will be reached. The derived game
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is a game of chicken and can be further analyzed using mixed strategies,
assuming both firms are indifferent between either strategy, i.e. indifferent
between either choosing Cournot
[
1
3
(a− b)] or Walras [1
2
(a− b)]. Due to
the fact that the above game is symmetric (albeit asymmetric equilibria) it
is sufficient to solve for only one firm with the following results:
pii,Walras =
[
1
9
(a− b)2
]
p+
[
13
72
a2 − 23
108
ab+
53
648
b2
]
(1− p) =[
1
6
a2 − 11
27
ab+
41
162
b2
]
p+
[
2
9
(a− b)2
]
(1− p) = pii,Cournot
(217)
p =
77
265
= 29.1% (Walras) (218)
(1− p) = 188
265
= 70.9% (Cournot) (219)
The Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies will have both firms choose Wal-
rasian strategies roughly 29% of the time and Cournot Strategies about 71%
of the time. Thus, the following percentages can be determined:
Walras [ 77
265
(29.1%)] Cournot [188
265
(70.9%)]
Walras [ 77
265
(29.1%)] 45
533
(8.4%) 47
228
(20.6%)
Cournot [188
265
(70.9%)] 47
228
(20.6%) 229
455
(50.3%)
Table 2: Mixed strategies in strategic Form (Cournot game)
The expected payoff for the mixed strategy equilibrium is:
Πi = Π−i =
45
265
(
1
9
(a− b)2
)
+
47
228
(
13
72
a2 − 23
108
ab+
53
648
b2
)
+
47
228
(
1
6
a2 − 11
27
ab+
41
162
b2
)
+
229
455
(
2
9
(a− b)2
) (220)
Πi = Π−i =
75
389
a2 − 367
991
ab+
82
431
b2 (221)
The mixed strategy outcome shows that the absolute profit maximizing strat-
egy combination (Cournot,Cournot) will be played 50.3% of the time, while
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the relative profit maximizing quantity at (Walras,Walras) will only be played
about 8.4% of the time. The two pure Nash equilibria derived through back-
ward induction, i.e. (Walras,Cournot) and (Cournot,Walras), will each be
played 20.6% of the time. It follows that at approximately 41.2% of the
time will one of the firm generate a competitive advantage by successfully
bringing marginal cost in period two below that of it’s competitor and creat-
ing a chance to reap extra large profits in absolute terms or outperform it’s
competitor by a larger relative amount than possible in period one.
71
3.11.2 Game Tree: Sequential Moves
From the sequential moves computation it is known that whether a firm is an
absolute profit maximizing Stackelberg leader or a relative profit maximizing
Stackelberg leader, it will choose the same quantity, i.e. yi =
1
2
(a− b). This
explains the choice vector at the first node, where the first mover’s absolute
and relative profit maximizing strategies align, i.e. only 1 quantity is optimal
in both relative and absolute terms. If the game continues to be symmetric
in period two, the first and second mover are confronted with same optimal
relative and absolute profit maximizing quantities and the first mover will
select the same quantity as in period one, whether the objective is absolute
or relative profit maximization. The Notation used in figure 3 is short for: SL
(Stackelberg leader), SF (Stackelberg follower), subscript A (absolute profit
maximizing strategy), and subscript R (relative profit maximizing strategy).
Once again, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium path is highlighted in red
and consists of absolute profit maximizing strategies throughout the entire
game, resulting in the Stackelberg leader employing her first mover’s advan-
tage to the fullest and creating a cost advantage in period two, leading to an
even bigger gap between the Stackelberg leader’s and Stackelberg follower’s
optimal quantity.
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Figure 3: Game tree Stackelberg model
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4 The Experimental Model
The Experimental model is simply a parameterized version of the general
model, which is why I decided to not go into further detail about the math-
ematical derivation of each and every equation9. The choice vector for the
simultaneous and the sequential moves model in period one consists of four
choices. I decided to always give player four options in order to make sure
that they could not just merely choose between the absolute and relative
profit maximizing quantities, thus, giving them more ”food for thought.”
Due to the 2-period structure, it seemed unwise to include more options as it
would have made the experiment more difficult, as more combination options
in period one would result in more possibilities in period two rendering the
experiment much more complex and maybe too time-consuming for players
to make an educated choice. A choice vector of four seemed the most appro-
priate in terms of timing and complexity. The Choices are a low quantity, the
absolute profit maximizing quantity, a high quantity, and the relative profit
maximizing quantity. Both absolute and relative quantity are computed for
the respective Cournot or Stackelberg model. The low and high quantities
are fitted equally, in terms of quantity distance, below and between the ab-
solute and relative profit maximizing quantity. In the Cournot game the low
quantity was always below the Cournot quantity, while the high quantity was
always between the Cournot and the Walrasian quantity, with the Walrasian
quantity being the highest quantity. In the Stackelberg game, due to the se-
quential nature of the model, this was somewhat different, in that, absolute
and relative profit maximizing quantities may be reversed in their order. This
means that for some scenarios in period two a low quantity may not exist
as the relative Stackelberg quantity represents the lowest quantity (this par-
ticular scenario is theoretically possible but experimental results show that
it never actually occurred during the experiment). Additionally, in period
one, the Stackelberg leader’s quantity vector consisted of one extra quantity,
which was the Cournot quantity. As I showed in the general model (previous
section), absolute and relative profit maximizing strategies for the Stackel-
berg leader coincide, decreasing her choices to three options only. I added the
Cournot quantity (40) to give the first mover the option to signal the second
mover that she is willing to cooperate instead of being competitive, in order
to avoid possible punishment. The following shows some of the mathematics
9Please see appendix H for a more detailed math workup.
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for the parameterized model.
Consider the following 2-period duopoly model with a one time possibil-
ity (period one) to invest into cost saving technologies, lowering period two’s
marginal cost.
Inverse Demand:
P t(Y t) = 160− Y t, where Y t =
2∑
i=1
yti (222)
Both firms face the following cost function:
Ct(yti) = 40(1− δti)yti , where (223)
δti =
I t−1i
pit−1i
2, and (224)
I t−1i =
pit−1i − pit−1−i
2
∀ pit−1i > pit−1−i > 0, else I t−1i = 0 (225)
δti =
pit−1i − pit−1−i
pit−1i
(226)
Again, it makes sense to assume that in the experiment the lower marginal
cost of period two did not ”magically” appear as some kind of extra gratifica-
tion, but rather brought about by an investment into, say, new technologies,
which then reduce production cost.
Both firms start out in symmetry, as the cost function’s δti does not yet
exist, assuming t being the first ever period. Thus, in period one, firms’ cost
functions are:
C(yi) = 40yi (227)
The Investment is non-optional if one firm reaches positive relative profits.
I ti =
piti − pit−i
2
∀ piti > pit−i > 0, else I ti = 0 (228)
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4.1 Simultaneous Moves
Deriving the Cournot quantity:
max
yi
pii = P (Y )yi − C(yi) (229)
FOC:
∂pii
∂yi
= 120− 2yi − y−i = 0 (230)
Reaction function:
Ri : yi(y−i) = 60− 1
2
y−i (231)
Optimal quantities:
y∗i = y
∗
−i = 40 (232)
Deriving the Walrasian quantity:
max
yi
(pii − pi−i) = max
yi
piRi (233)
Best reply function (independent of the other firm):
max
yi
piRi = (160− yi − y−i) yi − 40yi − [(160− yi − y−i) y−i − 40y−i] (234)
FOC:
∂piRi
∂yi
= 120− 2yi = 0 (235)
Optimal quantities:
y∗i = y
∗
−i = 60 (236)
Obviously, both Cournot and Walrasian quantities may not be an optimal
quantity in period two, if one of the players achieved positive realtive profits,
i.e. if players choose different strategies in period one, (40|60) or (60|40),
creating asymmetry in period two. I have already computed these cases in
the general model. Hence, I will here simply substitute the parameters into
the results derived earlier. Let us assume firm i is the Walrasian player while
firm -i is the Cournot player.
Cournot outcomes - Optimizing period two for (60|40):
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This means that the period one Walrasian player lowers marginal cost by
roughly 33% and its new cost function looks like this is:
C(yi) = 26
2
3
yi (237)
Objective function:
max
yi
pii = (160− yi − y−i) yi − 262
3
yi (238)
FOCs10
∂pii
∂yi
= 133
1
3
− 2yi − y−i = 0 (239)
and the FOC already computed in period one for firm -i:
∂pi−i
∂y−i
= 120− 2y−i − yi = 0 (240)
Reaction functions:
R−i : y−i(yi) = 60− 1
2
yi (241)
Optimal quantities in period two:
y∗i = 48
8
9
(242)
y∗−i = 35
5
9
(243)
This leaves only one other quantity to be computed, the Walrasian quantity
for the player with the cost advantage in period two. The Cournot-playing
firm from period one faces the same Walrasian quantity in period two due to
its unchanged marginal cost.
Walrasian outcomes - Optimizing period two for (60|40):
Deriving the Walrasian quantity:
max
yi
(pii − pi−i) = max
yi
piRi (244)
10Due to the asymmetry stemming from period one, there are two different objective
function.
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Best reply function (independent of the other firm):
max
yi
piRi = (160− yi − y−i) yi − 26
2
3
yi − [(160− yi − y−i) y−i − 40y−i] (245)
FOC:
∂piRi
∂yi
= 133
1
3
− 2yi = 0 (246)
Optimal quantities:
y∗i = 66
2
3
(247)
Firm -i’s optimal Walrasian output remains unchanged.
y∗−i = 60 (248)
The game tree (figure 4) and reduced from (figure 5) summarize strategies
and outcomes in the Cournot game. It does not include the low and high
quantity that were added to increase the choice vector. Adding the low
and high quantity would have created a game tree too large to be displayed
here. Also, it seems more appropriate to focus on the equilibrium paths in
each game, and low and high quantities do not play any role in deriving the
equilibrium in either one of the games.
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firm−i
firmi
firm−i
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2400, 2800
firm−i
2800, 2400
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firmi
firm−i
2064 1681 , 3390
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81
1432 881 , 3074
2
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firm−i
1466 23 , 2195
5
81
400, 1444 49
firm−i
firmi
firm−i
3390 1081 , 2064
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81
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2
3
firm−i
3074 227 , 1432
8
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1600, 1600
800, 1200
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C(40)
W (60)
C(40)
W (60)
C(40)
W (60)
C(40)
W (60)
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9
)
W (60)
C(48 8
9
)
W (66 2
3
)
C(40)
W (60)
C(40)
W (60)
C(40)
W (60)
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9
)
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3
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9
)
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3
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9
)
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9
)
W (60)
C(40)
W (60)
C(40)
W (60)
Figure 4: Game tree showing two sub-game perfect equilibria in pure strate-
gies at [(C|W ), (C|C)] and [(W |C), (C|C)].
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firmi
firm−i
3200, 3200
206416
81
, 339010
81
firm−i
339010
81
, 206416
81
1600, 1600
C(40)
W (60)
C(40)
W (60)
W (60)
C(40)
Figure 5: Reduced game tree with all players choosing Cournot quantities in
period two
The reduced form of the game tree, see figure 5, is created by adding
Cournot outcomes of period two to all strategies in period one. I can sim-
ply add these outcomes to period one as I know from the analysis that all
players choose absolute profit maximizing strategies in period two. The re-
sulting tree is much more user-friendly and the two sub-game perfect Nash
equilibria are easily identified. The reduced form can also be depicted in a
two by two table (table 3) indicating the same two Nash equilibria at [(W |C)
and (C|W )]. I then used mixed strategies to analyze further, assuming both
firms are indifferent between either strategy, i.e. Cournot or Walras. Due to
the fact that the above game is symmetric (though asymmetric equilibria) it
is sufficient to solve for only one firm.
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Walras Cournot
Walras 1600, 1600 339010
81
, 206416
81
Cournot 206416
81
, 339010
81
3200, 3200
Table 3: Strategic form with two Nash equilibria at [(W |C) and (C|W )
pii,Walras = 1600p+3390
10
81
(1−p) = 206416
81
p+3200(1−p) = pii,Cournot (249)
The general model results can be confirmed at:
p = 0.29 (Walras) (250)
p = 0.71 (Cournot) (251)
The mixing percentages are shown in table 4. The expected mixed strategy
Walras (29%) Cournot(71%)
Walras (29%) 8.4% 20.6%
Cournot (71%) 20.6% 50.3%
Table 4: Two by two table showing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
equilibrium profits is:
Πi = Π−i = 0.084 (1600) + 0.206
(
3391
10
81
)
+
0.206
(
2064
16
81
)
+ 0.504 (3200)
(252)
Πi = Π−i = 2870 (253)
It follows that if player behave in accordance with their mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium they can expect a payoff of 2870 in every game of the simulta-
neous moves experiment.
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4.2 Sequential Moves
The general model computation showed that whether a firm is an absolute
profit maximizing Stackelberg leader or a relative profit maximizing Stackel-
berg leader in period one (symmetry), it will choose the same quantity, i.e.
60. The outcome, therefore, in period one solely depends on the follower’s
decision to either maximizer absolute profits (30) or relative profits (60). A
Cournot quantity (40) as computed in the simultaneous moves game is not
part of the optimal quantity vector. I decided to keep the Cournot quan-
tity ”alive” in this sequential moves model for players seeking for example,
equality in profits or for the Stackelberg leader to avoid punishment by the
Stackelberg follower for choosing a competitive strategy; clearly though, not
an equilibrium path. The notation goes as follows: SL (Stackelberg leader),
SF (Stackelberg follower), subscript A (absolute profit maximizing strategy),
subscript R (relative profit maximizing strategy), and subscript C (Cournot
quantity).
The follower’s optimal reply function is equal to the reply function computed
under Cournot:
R−i : y−i(yi) = 60− 1
2
yi (254)
The leader’s profit function:
max
yi
pii =
[
160− yi −
(
60− 1
2
yi
)]
yi − 40yi (255)
∂pii
∂yi
= 60− yi = 0 (256)
The leader in optimum will choose :
y∗i = 60 (257)
The follower’s quantity is:
R−i : y−i(60) = 60− 1
2
60 (258)
y∗−i = 30 (259)
The absolute profit maximizing Stackelberg leader will produce 60 while the
absolute Stackelberg follower will produce 30. Thus, contrary to the simul-
taneous moves model, if both firms act in accordance with absolute profit
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maximizing strategies, the Stackelberg leader will have a cost advantage in
period two.
Relative profit maximizing strategies have already been calculated above (see
Walrasian strategies of simultaneous moves).
The follower objective function is:
max
y−i
piR−i = (160− yi − y−i) y−i − 40y−i − [(160− yi − y−i) yi − 40yi] (260)
FOC:
∂piR−i
∂y−i
= 120− 2y−i = 0 (261)
The follower’s optimal reply function is independent of the other firm’s out-
put:
y∗−i = 60 (262)
Thus, the leaders optimal profit, under consideration of the followers optimal
quantity choice:
max
yi
piRi =
(
160− yi − y∗−i
)
yi − 40yi −
[(
160− yi − y∗−i
)
y∗−i − 40y∗−i
]
(263)
The leader’s optimal quantity is also 60, as her quantity decision in this
symmetric model is independent of the followers output decision, and vice
versa.
∂piRi
∂yi
= 120− 2yi = 0 (264)
Hence:
y∗i = 60 (265)
Strategies in period one for the Stackelberg leader consist of only one quan-
tity in the choice vector, namely, 60. The outcome in period one and con-
sequently the respective quantity option in period two, solely depend on the
Stackelberg follower. This explains why the Stackelberg leader may have to
”fear” possible punishment due to her first mover advantage. This is the
reason why I decided to include the Cournot quantity (40) of the simultane-
ous moves game as part of the choice vector in period one11. It follows that
11Mathematical derivation of best relies to quantity 40, which will not play a role in the
equilibrium path, can be found in appendix H.
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a possible asymmetric setting in period one is created by the Stackelberg
follower. It is up to her to decide whether she gives the first mover a cost
advantage in period two or chooses a zero payoff for both players in period
one, keeping the model symmetric in period two. There are two possible
outcomes in period one, [(60|30)(60|60)], whereas (60|30) create asymmetry
in period two while (60|60) keeps things symmetric in period two.
Absolute Profit maximizing outcomes in period two for (60|60):
As the model remains symmetric, there are no changes in the cost struc-
ture for neither one of the firms, quantity options are identical to those in
period one, i.e. the Stackelberg leader chooses 60 whether she is a relative
or absolute profit maximizer and the Stackelberg follower chooses between
30 has her absolute profit maximizing quantity or 60 as her relative profit
maximizing quantity. If the Stackelberg follower plays 60 in both periods,
both firms will leave the game earning a payoff equal to zero. It seems likely
that even if the Stackelberg follower plays 60 in period one, she will choose
30 (the absolute profit maximizing quantity) in period two, in order to not
leave the game without any payoff.
Absolute Profit maximizing outcomes in period two for (60|30)12:
The Stackelberg follower’s optimal reply to whatever strategy the leader will
choose is, again, and due to the fact that it’s cost function did not change,
the same as derived under standard Cournot:
R−i : y−i(yi) = 60− 1
2
yi
Substituting firm -i’s best response into firm i’s profit function yields the
following optimal quantity for the Stackelberg leader in period two:
max
yi
pii =
[
160− yi −
(
60− 1
2
yi
)]
yi − 20yi (266)
∂pii
∂yi
= 80− yi = 0 (267)
12In addition to the first mover’s larger payoff in period one, she also decreases her
marginal cost to half their original size, i.e. 20 in period two.
83
The leader in optimum will choose :
y∗i = 80 (268)
The follower’s quantity is:
R−i : y−i(80) = 60− 1
2
80 (269)
Thus, the follower in optimum will choose :
y∗−i = 20 (270)
Relative Profit maximizing outcomes in period two for (60|30):
The Stackelberg follower faces the same cost function in period two as she
did in period one, i.e. marginal cost equal 40, as she did not achieve positive
relative profits on accounts of her chosen quantity being lower than that of
her competitor. Therefore, her relative profit maximizing quantity in period
two is, just as in period one, 60.
The Stackelberg leader’s objective function is:
max
yi
piRi = (160− yi − y−i) yi − 20yi − [(160− yi − y−i) y−i − 40y−i] (271)
FOC:
∂piRi
∂yi
= 140− 2yi = 0 (272)
The Stackelberg leader’s new relative profit maximizing quantity, at marginal
cost equal to 20, is:
y∗i = 70 (273)
It is important to not forget one possible quantity for the Stackelberg fol-
lower. Given the sequential nature of the model, the Stackelberg follower has
a best reply, in terms of absolute profits, to the Stackelberg leader’s relative
profit maximizing quantity. One must, therefore, ask, how does the second
mover optimally respond if the first mover plays its relative profit maximiz-
ing quantity (70)?
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The Stackelberg follower’s optimal reply to the leader’s relative profit maxi-
mizing quantity is:
R−i : y−i(yi) = 60− 1
2
70 (274)
An absolute profit maximizer chooses:
y∗−i = 25 (275)
The game tree (figure 6) summarized the above computations and allows for a
concise way to find the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
The equilibrium path is highlighted in red and constitutes absolute profit
maximizing Stackelberg play throughout. This makes it fundamentally dif-
ferent from the simultaneous moves game, where the investment possibility
changed the game from two Nash equilibria in pure strategies to one with a
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Thus, in this Stackelberg model, the-
ory predicts the usual Stackelberg outcome at [(60|30) and (80|20)], though,
at substantially higher (lower) profits for the Stackelberg leader (Stackelberg
follower) due to the arising asymmetry, i.e. the lower marginal cost for the
Stackelberg leader, in period two.
firmi firm−i
firmi
firm−i
4550, 1300
1350,−300
firm−i
4500, 1525
2050, 300
firmi firm−i
1800, 900
0, 0
SLA/R(60)
SFR(60)
SFA(30)
SLA/R(60)
SLA(80)
SLR(70)
SFA(30)
SFR(60)
SFA(20)
SFR(60)
SFA(25)
SFR(60)
Figure 6: Game tree for the sequential moves game with one sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies at [(60|30) and (80|20)].
Game tree, figure 7, includes the Cournot quantity (green branch). It is
not part of the equilibrium path, however, may present an important feature,
as players may be inequality averse and, thus, choose Cournot quantities to
ensure equal payoff distributing (computations for the Cournot branch are
in Appendix H).
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1
3
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SLR(60)
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SLR(70)
SLA/R(60)
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2
3
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2
3
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2
3
)
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SFR(60)
Figure 7: Sequential moves game tree with the addition of the Cournot
quantity for inequality averse player.
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4.3 Short Preliminary Summary
So far I have introduced the general and experimental model upon which the
dissertation is based. The model is split into a simultaneous moves game and
a sequential moves game. In the simultaneous moves game first and second
period strategies and outcomes were computed and possible changes from
the symmetric to an asymmetric setting through the achievement of posi-
tive relative profits were distinguished. To be more specific, two outcomes
in period one resulted in a change from symmetry in period one to asym-
metry in period two, i.e. in case firms choses different strategies in period
one, meaning Cournot quantities or Walrasian quantities. The other 2 cases
resulted in essentially the same strategy options in period two as in period
one. Two Nash equilibria in pure strategies were found and indicated as
such, which constituted a game of chicken. Further analysis showed a Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies. Strategies and outcome in the sequential
model were somewhat different. The outcome in period one depends only on
the strategy of the Stackelberg follower as the Stackelberg leader’s absolute
and relative profit maximizing strategy align, i.e. they are the same quantity
(60). Asymmetry was created if the follower chooses any strategy other than
the quantity chosen by the Stackelberg leader in period one. The sequential
moves model resulted in only one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. No
further analysis was necessary. In a second game tree Cournot quantities
were added to the sequential moves game to indicate that players may hold
preferences other than selfish profit maximization. This, however, was not
part of the equilibrium analysis - but will become important in the following
experiment.
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5 Experimental Procedures
Both the simultaneous moves model and the sequential moves model were
put to the test experimentally. This was done at the marketing laboratory
for economic and marketing research at the University of Kaiserslautern,
Germany13 in May 2012. Participants for both experiments were recruited
in class or through sign-up list on campus. All participants were either stu-
dents of business administration, business administration in connection with
a multitude of natural science concentration, engineering, or mathematics.
Most participants had reached at least their second year of study. In total
47 students were invited to take part in the experiments. For the simultane-
ous moves experiment (May 02, 2012) 24 students were invited, all of whom
showed at the designated time and location, and 20 took part in the actual
experiment14. For the sequential moves experiment (May 30, 2012) 23 stu-
dents were invited. All 23 students showed up for the experiment. During the
introduction phase, it turned out that one participant had not understood
the experiment and was replaced by another student. Two students, plus the
one student that did not understand the game, were randomly selected, paid
15.00 EUR, and sent home.
Both simultaneous and sequential moves model were ”pen and paper” based
and did not involve any special economics laboratory software, but instead,
involved a computer-based spreadsheet from which participants were able
to select quantities. In both experiments subjects were randomly assigned
to a specific computer in the laboratory, which ensure random matching of
the participants, as it was predefined which computer would play another
computer. After the instructions (see Appendix A and B) were read and the
spreadsheet thoroughly explained, participants were encouraged to ask ques-
tions, which were answered on an individual level. I also proceeded to go from
computer to computer to ensure everyone had understood the instructions
13I would like to thank Professor Dr. Stefan Roth and the department of marketing for
letting me use their lab to run both experiments and for their help with all IT related
issues in the laboratory.
14I invited 24 in case of no-shows and in case I had to replace certain participants in
the event that someone did not understand the experiment. As everyone understood the
instructions - tested by a short questionnaire, I sent 4 participants (that were randomly
selected) home with a pay of 15.00 (EUR). this may seem like a rather large amount of
money, however, in oder to make sure everyone understood the experiment participants
had to sit through about 45 minutes of introduction and preparatory work.
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and to see if there were questions or problems that needed clarification. Par-
ticipants, then, were asked to fill out a short questionnaire (see Appendix C
and D) to verify if, in fact, all participants had understood the experiments.
Both experiments consisted of ten games consisting of 2 periods each, which
players were informed about15. Quantity options in both simultaneous and
sequential games, consisted of four choices, including the absolute profit max-
imizing quantity, the relative profit maximizing quantity, a quantity between
the absolute and relative profit maximizing quantity and a quantity below
which ever quantity (absolute or relative profit maximizing) was lowest. In
the simultaneous moves game the absolute profit maximizing quantity was
always lower than the relative profit maximizing quantity. In the sequential
moves game, the order depended on the outcome in period one, meaning,
for certain outcomes in period 1, the relative profit maximizing quantity in
period 2 may be lower that the absolute profit maximizing quantity (this,
however, was merely a theoretical possibility and did not occur in the exper-
iment).
Players were also informed that they would receive a participation payment
of 7.00 EUR and additionally would receive the amount (payoff) earned in
each period of the game. Players were informed that the payment in each
period would depend on their quantity choice and the quantity choice of their
opponent, who was not known to the player and was not visually accessible
to them. In every period, Participants would note their quantity choice on
a record sheet (Appendix E). We would then walk from player to player
and note their decision on the experimenters’ record sheet (Appendix F)
and report the opponent’s choice in each period. This made for quite a bit of
walking back and forth between players but ensure a doubling up on reported
quantities and ensured no falsification of previous quantities. Additionally,
and after both quantities (their own and their opponents) were reported to
all players, the experimenter indicated (by filling in the designated space on
the players’ record sheet) the players and its opponent’s payoff. Thus, there
were four entries to be made on each player’s record sheet. The player’s
quantity (noted by the player herself), the opponent’s quantity, and the pay-
offs of both players (all three made by the experimenter). Experimenters
15Experimental evidence suggest that, except for a possible end effect, finite and infinite
time horizons show no significant behavioral difference, see Selten and Stoecken (1986)
[42].
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used a special pen to ensure that players were unable to change or falsify
quantities and payoffs. This procedure was then repeated for all 10 games,
i.e. 20 periods.
5.1 Simultaneous Moves Model (Cournot Game)
All 20 players were informed that they are facing a market with two partici-
pants (duopoly) in which they would play a randomly selected opponent each
period. They were also informed that they would play a new opponent every
period and would never meet the same opponent twice, thus, the Cournot
game was designed to be a random treatment in order to minimize the effects
resulting from coordination16. After the instructions were read to them, the
experimenter introduced the computer-based spread sheet (see figure 8). The
spreadsheet was installed and opened at every computer and all participants
had their own computer and were unable to see other players choices. Each
player worked with the same spreadsheet and each computer screen showed
the same information to each player. Spreadsheets worked the following way:
Players could only select two cells, which included a drop-down menu con-
sisting of four different quantities in period 1 - 30, 40, 50, and 60. The two
selectable cells were the the player’s quantity and the opponent’s quantity.
Depending on which quantities were selected, the spreadsheet would produce
a payoff table for period 1 and period 2. Additionally, each player was given
a payoff table for period 1 (Appendix G) consisting of all quantity combina-
tions and their respective profits, payoffs, investments, and cost for period
2. The printed payoff tables gave players a complete view of all options in
period 1.
Players were asked to make a quantity decision in period one. If they success-
fully outperformed their opponent in terms of profits, then their firm would
invest into cost-saving technologies driving down production cost in period
two, thus creating a competitive advantage in period two. The amount the
outperforming firm invests is equal to half of the difference of the firms’ prof-
its. If the firm got outperformed in terms of profit, then the opponent would
16The author gained some experience from a different experiment run at the University of
Magdeburg in 2007 during which players that remained in fixed pairs appeared to develop
some form of tacit mutual coordination, where players developed a switching dynamic to
gain extra ordinary profits. this was an unexpected, though interesting result, but was
not part of the research question here, see Kecinski and Riechmann (2010) [24].
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invest into cost-saving technologies generating a competitive advantage in
period two. Each Player’s payoff in period one is the difference between their
firm’s profit and investment. The Spreadsheet included all information of
the printed payoff table and additionally would show the respective quantity
options for period two and its respective payoffs. It seemed rather incon-
venient to print all possible outcomes in period two resulting from choices
made in period one, as this would have resulted in too many payoff tables.
Thus, players had to turn to their spreadsheet, which helped them simulate
all combinations in period one and the respective option in period two. For
example: If in period one both players chose a quantity of 40, both firms
made the same profit and both players received the same payoff on account
of no investments, as relative profits were equal to zero. If, however, one
firm produces more than it’s opponent, than, the firm with the larger out-
put invests into cost-saving technologies lowering marginal cost in period
two, creating an advantage over it’s competitor. The resulting quantity op-
tions in period two are now different from period one and different from it’s
opponent (asymmetric setting). Depending on the size of the investment dif-
ferent quantity choices for the firms are available in period two. Therefore,
it seemed easier for firms to simulate all outcomes in a spreadsheet and un-
derstand how period two choices are generated. After all players were done
testing the spreadsheet and considering all options for period one and two,
the actual experiment started.
5.2 Sequential Moves Model (Stackelberg Game)
All 20 players were informed that they are facing a duopolistic market in
which they would play the same opponent, which had been randomly se-
lected, for all 10 games. I decided to keep players in fixed pairs as I was
interested to see if there would be play that qualifies as inequality averse,
see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) [13] and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)[10], ei-
ther through punishment of the Stackelberg follower, i.e. by deliberately
playing above absolute profit maximizing Stackelberg follower’s quantities to
shrink Stackelberg leader’s payoff and to avoid being outperformed in terms
of relative profits, and, thus, giving the first mover an even bigger advantage
in period two; or through cooperative behavior of the Stackelberg leader,
i.e. choosing below profit maximizing Stackelberg leader’s quantity to avoid
a possible punishment by the second mover. After the instructions were
read out loud, the experimenter continued explaining the computer-based
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Figure 8: Example of simultaneous moves game spreadsheet for period one
choices (60|40)
spreadsheet. Due to the sequential nature of the game, two slightly different
spreadsheets were used, one for the Stackelberg leaders (see figure 9) and
one for the Stackelberg followers (see figure 10). Stackelberg leaders and
followers were strategically placed in the laboratory to ensure that no player
would be able to visually identify their opponent. Players were asked to first
identify if they were first mover or second mover. Just like the simultaneous
game, players could only select two cells in the spreadsheet containing a drop-
down menu from which they had to select a quantity. For the first mover
four different quantity option were available - 30, 40, 50, and 60. Although
the second mover was able to simulate all possible quantity-scenarios in the
spreadsheet, they had to wait until the Stackelberg leader made its quantity
decision in order for them to know what the four quantity options for them
were. This is straight forward, as a different quantity from the Stackelberg
leader would result in, for example, a different absolute profit maximizing
quantity for the Stackelberg follower. Players were given about 20 minutes
to practice and simulate all possible outcome for period one and period two.
This meant that, while Stackelberg leaders were able to pick quantities they
may actually select in the following experiment, Stackelberg followers had
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to make an assumption about what the Stackelberg leader’s quantiy might
be and then identify the option that they would select should such case arise.
An important difference in the Stackelberg model, compared to the Cournot
model is that for the Stackelberg leader in period one absolute and rela-
tive profit maximizing strategies coincide, i.e. 60. I decided to include the
Cournot quantity from the simultaneous game, i.e. 40, in order to give first
movers the option to offer a quantity to the second mover that seemed ”fair”
in terms of equal payoff. A second mover that received a quantity of 40
could now decide whether it wanted to outperform its competitor to lower
cost for period two or reciprocate by also choosing 40 to generate equal mar-
ket share and profit. They also had to consider their future relationship, in
that, responding competitively to a 40 quantity may destroy future equal play
possibilities as the Stackelberg leader may use its first mover advantage to
outperform the Stackerlberg follower for the rest of the game. Hence, in the
sequential moves game players did not only have to consider the investment
into cost-saving technologies and creating a competitive advantage in period
two but also strategic play in terms of punishment and cooperation. Payoffs
in period one are computed identical to the simultaneous moves game, in
that, it is the firm’s profit minus the investment. The investment is half of
the positive relative difference in firm profits. The decision process due to
the sequential nature of the game is as follows: The Stackelberg leader de-
cides on a quantity in period one and notes it on the provided record sheet.
The experimenter reports the quantity to the Stackelberg follower who enters
the Stackelberg leaders quantity into the spreadsheet and has four quantity
options available to choose from. After the Stackelberg follower decided on
its quantity, payoffs in period one are reported to both players. The spread-
sheet shows the payoff table for period two, which depend on the quantity
choices in period one. The Stackelberg leader, once again, moves first and
selects one of four possible quantities, notes it on the record sheet and the
experimenter reports it to the second mover, who herself has four possible
choices available. This process is repeated for all 10 games. After all players
were done testing the spreadsheet the experiment started.
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Figure 9: Example of sequential moves game spreadsheet (Stackelberg leader)
for period one choices (60|30)
Figure 10: Example of sequential moves game spreadsheet (Stackelberg fol-
lower) for period one choices (30|60)
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6 Experimental Results
For the simultaneous moves Cournot model, the key questions are:
1. Are there differences in the selected quantities in period one and pe-
riod two?
2. Do players who choose relative profit maximizing quantities, display such
behavior because they receive enjoyment from simply beating other players,
or is there another reason to do so, namely, an advantage in market position
in period two with lower marginal cost resulting in a competitive advantage,
which ensure higher future profits?
For the sequential moves Stackelberg model, the key question are:
3. Are there differences in players quantity decision in period one and period
two that are in line with theoretical predictions?
4. Do players try to coordinate behavior in such a way that may be called
inequality averse? In this case I expect to see cooperation and punishment
attempts.
Payoff comparison between the the two treatments:
5. Are there payoff differences between the treatments and do payoffs deviate
from theorized outcomes?
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6.1 Cournot Game
Figues 11 and 12 depict players’ choices in the simultaneous moves game in
period one and in period two. The striking difference is in the number of
Cournot plays (C) and the relative profit maximizing quantity, i.e. Walrasian
quantity (W) in the two periods.17 In period one, the Cournot quantity was
only the second most popular quantity, and was selected 38 times. While in
Period two it is the most popular choice for players, selected 145 times (72%
of the time of all choices). The low quantity (L) appears to have no real
importance in either period as it was only selected twice in period one and
six times in period two. (30|30), which was the combination of (L|L) repre-
sents the collusive outcome in the symmetric game. Thus, it can be noted,
that collusion does not appear to be of any relevance in this model. The
high quantity (H) appears to be more important in period one, selected 55
times (or 27% of the time) while in period two (H) was played 41 time (21%
of the time). The Walrasian quantity (W) was the most frequent choice in
period one with players selecting (W) 105 times (or 53% of the time), while
in period two it was merely chosen 8 time (4% of the time).
Table 5 summarizes all quantity choices in period one and two. Theory
predicted that player choose absolute profit maximizing quantities in period
two. This seems rather intuitive as no further investment takes place, i.e.
there is no third period. However, one cannot forget about players behaving
spitefully, trying to beat their opponent in terms of profit. The experimental
data suggests that only 4% of all second period choices consisted of Wal-
rasian quantities. The Walrasian quantity, thus, seems like a rather bad
prediction for second period behavior. High quantities were chosen 21% of
the time, which one may interpret as a mild spite effect, in that players tried
to somewhat outdo their competitor but not fully at the expense of their
own payoff. Cournot quantities were the most dominant choice in period two
falling right in line with the theoretical prediction. Therefore, the Cournot
quantity appears to be a rather good prediction for players that have no
17Quantities are labeled L for low, this is the quantity below the Cournot quantity; C for
Cournot quantity; H for high quantity, signaling an increase from the Cournot quantity;
and W for Walrasian quantity. I chose to label the respective quantities in this fashion, as
quantities in period two were subject to change resulting from the choices made in period
one, i.e. period one’s Cournot quantity (40) may not be the Cournot quantity in period
two due to the possible asymmetric market in period two.
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further incentive to lower marginal cost. Comparing Walrasian and Cournot
quantities in both periods, it appears that players act spitefully whenever it
serve a purpose, instead of the pure joy received from beating the opponent.
It is exactly this purpose, i.e. investment into cost-saving technologies, that
gives players the reason to act spitefully. Without such reason, as in period
two, players are absolute profit maximizing seeking. Indeed, the Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test shows that second period choices are signif-
icantly lower (*** at the 1% level, one-tailed)18.
These results suggest that there appears to be a reason for spiteful play,
as period one results are much more competitive than period two results. In
fact, in period one, Walrasian quantities represent the median and mode of
all quantities chosen. Period two results show that Cournot play does not
only represent the median but is also modal. When looking at both periods
combined a very interesting observation can be made, that is, theory seems
to be a somewhat good prediction for behavior in this particular setup. As I
showed in the general model section, there are two pure strategy Nash equi-
libria at (Cournot|Walras) and (Walras|Cournot) indicating that no other
quantity plays a role in the theoretical outcome. This can be confirmed
experimentally. Even more interesting is the fact that the mixed strategy
equilibrium predicts a Walrasian strategies to be played 29% of the time.
This can also be confirmed experimentally, where Walrasian strategies were
selected 28.25% of the time. The Cournot quantity, as predicted by theory,
is selected most frequently at roughly 45% of the time. This falls short of the
mixed strategy prediction of 71%, however, Cournot play is modal, selected
183 times out of 400, throughout the game, leaving the Walrasian quantity
in second place at 113. The experimental findings in the Cournot game leave
theory as a decent predictor of overall play.
18See table 6 for Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test computation. I decided to
compute statistical results manually as it allows for a better and thorough understanding
of ones data - plus, in this particular case the data set was rather small and therefore easy
to handle manually.
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Figure 11: Frequency Distribution of Quantity Choices in Period 1 (Simul-
taneous Moves)
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Figure 12: Frequency Distribution of Quantity Choices in Period 2 (Simul-
taneous Moves)
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Table 5: Frequency Distribution of Quantity Choices in Period 1 and 2 (Si-
multaneous Moves)
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6.1.1 Analysis of Individual Behavior
This subsection is designed to discuss some specifically interesting cases on
the individual level. As I asked each individual after the experiment was
over, to write down their motivation for making choices in period one and in
period two, some insight into why players made certain decision may bring a
certain amount of clarity into their decision making process; an added extra
may be to see if players chose certain strategies for reason other than previ-
ously though of or discussed here.
For example, Player one writes that in period one his decision was based
on playing high quantities to lower cost in period two. Whereas in period
two he expresses his goal to be absolute profit maximization (figures 13 and
14). It is exactly this behavior that motivated me to examine whether there
was a reason for spiteful behavior. Player one explains this reason to be
more profits in period two. One may conclude from this that spiteful behav-
ior is perfectly in line with absolute profit maximizing behavior, as it may
be the a certain amount of foresight, i.e. non-myopic profit maximization.
A firm in its quest for higher and higher profits may forgo immediate profits
in favor of even higher profits tomorrow and ultimately to gain a monopoly
position (or simply larger market share) to reap extraordinary large profits,
thus, making up for smaller profits in the short-run. Player eight (figures
15 and 16) reports similar incentives with period one being an investment
period and period two setting focus on largest payoff possible. Player nine
(figures 17 and 18) explains that her opponents forced her to play the Wal-
rasian quantity and that diverting to a lower quantity would have resulted
in a disadvantageous position in period two. For her it was the threat of
being outperformed instead of outperforming the opponent. Player 17’s (fig-
ure 19 and 20) choices in each period consisted of only one quantity, namely,
the Walrasian quantity in period one and the Cournot quantity in period
two. Player eleven (figures 21 and 22 ) notes that first she tried to have the
lowest possible cost in period two, but then changed to an absolute profit
maximizing strategy in period one. Period two consisted of absolute profit
maximizing behavior. Perhaps player 12 explained player eleven’s behavior
best by noting that it was very difficult to make guesses about the other
players’ period one decisions and maybe the best thing to do is just Cournot
throughout resulting in equal payoff distribution in the entire game. How-
ever, herein lies the threat of being outperformed and loosing market power.
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Player eleven changed her strategy after noting that playing the Walrasian
strategy resulted in a zero payoff on account of her opponent also selecting
the Walrasian strategy. Her absolute profit maximizing behavior may be
the attempt to coordinate behavior, which, given the random matching, was
difficult to do.
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Figure 13: Bar chart of player one’s quantity choices
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Figure 15: Bar chart of player eight’s quantity choices
H 
W 
H 
C 
H H 
W W 
H 
W 
C C C 
C 
C 
C C C 
C 
C 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Player 8 
Period 1
Period 2
Figure 16: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player eight
104
02
4
6
8
10
12
L C H W
Player 9 
Period 1
Period 2
Figure 17: Bar chart of player nine’s quantity choices
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Figure 19: Bar chart of player 17’s quantity choices
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Figure 21: Bar chart of player eleven’s quantity choices
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Figure 22: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player eleven
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The following results can be concluded by answering the first two ques-
tions raised at the beginning of the results section:
1. Are there differences in the selected quantities in period one and pe-
riod two?
Yes, they are significant at the 1% level, suggesting that spiteful behav-
ior, i.e. choosing Walrasian strategies, in period one serves the purpose of
gaining a competitive advantage for period two through lower marginal cost
and higher payoff in period two. Thus, players act spitefully not because the
receive enjoyment from beating their opponent but for non-myopic reasons
of absolute profits maximization.
2. Do players who choose relative profit maximizing quantities, display such
behavior because they receive enjoyment from simply beating other players,
or is there another reason to do so, namely, an advantage in market position
in period two with lower marginal cost resulting in a competitive advantage,
which ensure higher future profits.
This can also be confirmed, as period two quantities were significant lower
than those in period one, suggesting that spiteful behavior may take on the
motive of strictly competitive behavior securing long-term market position
rather than short-term payoff maximization. this can be confirmed on the
individual level, as well. It was very interesting seeing players choices and
reasoning for their decision. Overall players knew exactly what strategy to
follow and how this strategy changed from period one to period two.
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6.2 Stackelberg Game
The sequential moves game was somewhat more difficult to analyze due to the
Stackelberg leader and Stackelberg follower distinction. Unlike the Cournot
game, where all players were essentially the same, at least in the beginning
of every game, here, the Stackelberg leader was, theoretically, in a more ad-
vantageous position to earn extra large profits. Theory predicts, despite the
investment possibility, one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, namely, abso-
lute profit maximizing Stackelberg play throughout for both players. Thus,
spiteful motives are theoretically not part of the outcome. However, one
need not forget that absolute profit maximizing and relative profit maxi-
mizing strategies converge in this particular model, leaving the Stackelberg
leader with only one best option in period one. It follows that the prediction
for the Stackelberg leader is to use its first movers advantage to exploit the
Stackelberg follower, leaving the Stackelberg follower in an even worse situ-
ation in period two with a large disadvantage in marginal cost.
Figures 23 and 24 depict all choices in period one and period two of all
players. Interestingly, the absolute profit maximizing Stackelberg quantity
in period one runs in a close second to last place only being selected 11% of
the time. As a matter of fact, all quantities other then the Cournot quantity,
are selected very little of the time, i.e. (L) at 9%, (H) at 13%, and (RS)
at 14% (see table 7). The Cournot quantity in period one was selected 110
out of 200 times and reigns at 55%. Compared to the theoretical prediction,
this appears to be very surprising. However, when considering preferences
such as inequality aversion, Stackelberg leaders’ and Stackelberg followers’
choices take on a different shape. If, for example, a Stackelberg leader can
choose between an equal payoff split between herself and her opponent, she
may be inclined to choose such a quantity, as she may consider her dominant
strategy, resulting in a large relative difference in payoff, ”unfair.” Similarly,
a Stackelberg follower who observes a Stackelberg leader playing a quantity
that results in a large relative difference in payoff between herself and her op-
ponent, may choose equality in payoffs considerations over the absolute profit
maximizing choice and punish her opponent by following suit and eliminate
profits for both players in period one. Figures 25-28 may hint into that di-
rection.
The observations show that, in period one, 58% of the time Stackelberg
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leaders played the Cournot quantity instead of their dominant strategy, i.e.
absolute Stackelberg (AS), which was selected only 16 times or 16% of the
time. It appears that Stackelberg followers reciprocated by also choosing the
Cournot quantity, their best reply in terms of absolute profits, 52% of the
time. Interestingly, second movers selected the relative profit maximizing
Stackelberg quantity 27 times or 27% of the time. This is may be interpreted
as a punishment strategy. If the Stackelberg leader plays any quantity higher
than the Cournot quantity, Stackelberg followers can eliminate the Stackel-
berg leaders profits and cost advantage in period two by choosing any strategy
higher than their absolute profit maximizing output in period one. By doing
so, they also eliminate their own period one profits, however, they may de-
cide to do so in an effort to change the Stackelberg leader’s strategy in the
following game. Thus, relative profit maximizing strategies may be viewed as
a means to scold the Stackelberg leader for choosing a quantity that results
in an unequal payoff distribution, and as the attempt to redirect the first
mover’s choice to cooperatively choosing Cournot strategies. This will be
analyzed more closely when I look at pair-wise comparison in the next part.
Table 7: Frequency Distribution of Quantity Choices in Period 1 and 2 (Se-
quential Moves)
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Figure 23: Frequency Distribution of Quantity Choices in Period 1 (Sequen-
tial Moves)
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Figure 24: Frequency Distribution of Quantity Choices in Period 2 (Sequen-
tial Moves)
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Figure 25: Frequency Distribution of Stackelberg leaders in Period 1
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Figure 26: Frequency Distribution of Stackelberg followers in Period 1
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Figure 27: Frequency Distribution of Stackelberg leaders in Period 2
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Figure 28: Frequency Distribution of Stackelberg followers in Period 2
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Table 8 summarizes the complete Stackelberg game including all choices
of Stackelberg leaders and Stackelberg followers. Theory predicted one sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies consisting of only absolute
profit maximizing behavior creating a large cost advantage for the Stack-
elberg leader in period two. A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test
(two-tailed) shows that there are no significant differences between the pe-
riods with respect to chosen quantities. This, however, may be a somewhat
inconclusive outcome as the larger Stackelberg leader quantity may be off-
set by the lower Stackelberg follower quantity. It may more meaningful to
analyze mean choices when divided into first and second mover categories.
Tables 9 and 10 summarize all choices for Stackelberg leaders and Stackelberg
followers, respectively. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (one-
tailed) shows that for Stackelberg leaders’ period two choices are significantly
higher (***at the 1% level) compared to period one choices. Stackelberg fol-
lowers show the reversed outcome, i.e. period one choices are significantly
higher (also at the ***1% level) than period two choices. This result hints
towards the outcome predicted by theory.
However, Cournot play is modal for both Stackelberg leaders and Stackelberg
followers. So how can the differences in the two periods be explained? First
one needs to compare the actual strategies in each period to the theoretically
predicted outcome. Given the nature of the model, a Cournot quantity in pe-
riod two can only exist if period one strategies consist of (Cournot|Cournot)
or (absolute Stackelberg|relative Stackelberg), i.e. (40|40) or (60|60), render-
ing the Cournot quantity relatively fragile to minor variations. Additionally,
Period two is the last period in each game and punishment may be less likely.
It follows that Stackelberg leaders may look for their dominant strategy in
period two more so than in period one, as they do not need to fear the Stack-
elberg follower’s choice as much as they did in period one. This effect may
be weakened by the fixed pairing applied in the experiment, i.e. Stackel-
berg leaders knew they would face the same opponent in all games of the
experiment. On the other hand, Stackelberg followers incentive to punish
Stackelberg leaders in period two may be diminished as no further period
exists. This effect too may be weakened due to the fixed pairing. It follows,
that Stackelberg leaders and followers may be willing to play absolute profit
maximzing quantities more so in period two than in period one. Also, no
further investment is possible in period two, which may speak in favor of abso-
lute profit maximizing strategies. Another reason why Stackelberg followers’
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choices in period two are lower than in period one may lie in punishment in
period one, navigating Stackelberg leaders to the Cournot Quantity in the
following games. Thus, it may not be the sequential nature of the model
that is responsible for the lower (higher) quantities in period one (two) for
the Stackelberg leader (follower) but it may be the result of fairness consider-
ations and punishment possibilities that lead to the selected quantities. The
latter may explain the non-equal quantity play in both periods and Cournot
play being modal for both first and second movers. In fact there is only one
successful strategy profile consisting of all abolute profit maximizing strate-
gies, as predicted by theory, and 39 strategy profiles consiting of all Cournot
play. One may call this a relatively strong indicator for inequality averse
preferences over dominant strategies. These results are similar to Huck et
al. (2002) [22] who found that despite theoretical predictions Stackelberg
leadership almost never emerges. Instead they found that the Cournot-Nash
was achieved in about 50% of all plays. Fonseca et al. (2005)[15] added
asymmetry to the model which, theoretically, should strengthen the emer-
gence of Stackelberg leadership of the low-cost firm, just as in this present
model. They also confirm that despite the introduced asymmetry Cournot
play is the most frequently played quantity.
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Table 9: Complete data set of choices made by Stackelberg leaders. The
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (one-tailed) shows that output in
Period two is significantly higher that output in period one at the 1% level.
Table 10: Complete data set of choices made by Stackelberg followers. The
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (one-tailed) shows that output in
Period two is significantly lower that output in period one at the 1% level.
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6.2.1 Analysis of Individual Behavior
Individual behavior in the sequential game is of particular interest due to
strong deviation from theoretical prediction, i.e. Stackelberg quantities through-
out (theoretical outcome) and Cournot play (experimental modal play). There-
fore, this section is meant to break things down to the individual level and
find out how competitors behaved throughout the ten games. Just like in the
simultaneous moves game, I asked players to indicate what their motivation
to choose a particular strategy in both periods was. More specifically, I am
looking for cooperation and punishment behavior and whether players’ ex-
planations as to why they selected a certain strategy matches their behavior.
Figures 29 and 30 show the behavior of player Player 4 (Stackelberg leader)
and player 14 (Stackelberg follower). The Stackelberg follower appears to
play quantities that reward the first mover for cooperative behavior (Cournot)
and punish him for more competitive play, e.g. in game 1 the Stackelberg
follower plays its relative profit maximizing quantity following an absolute
profit maximizing quantity, thus, punishing the first mover by erasing all
profits, while in game 2 the Stackelberg follower rewards the Stackelberg
leader with cooperation by playing Cournot following a Cournot quantity.
Player 14 notes that his behavior in period 1 is driven by ensuring that the
opponent is not earning higher profits than he does. In period 2 it was
absolute profit maximization that drove his behavior, however, not at the
expense of breaking the cooperation that had emerged. Quantities higher
than Cournot are punished with competitive play while Cournot is rewarded
with cooperation. Player 4 responds to payer 14’s behavior by only selecting
Cournot quantities starting game 2. Player 2 (Stackelberg leader) and player
12 (Stackelberg follower) quickly developed Cournot play, see figure 31. Here
it was vice versa, namely, the Stackelberg leader was trying to avoid punish-
ment and was interested in equal payoff distribution until the very last game,
game 10 period 2, were he no longer had to maintain cooperation. Figure 32
shows the end effect, which stresses the fact that it was not only inequality
aversion that made player 2 play Cournot but, due to the fixed pairing, fear
of punishment by the Stackelberg follower. Player 2 notes that he was trying
to ”get a feel” for his opponent and noticed right away that cooperation was
possible. Player 12 writes that her behavior was strict profit maximization,
which worked out well for her as her opponent offered Cournot quantities
resulting in the Cournot quantity as a best reply.
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Figure 33 and Figure 34 depict Player 5 (Stackelberg leader) and player 15
(Stackelberg follower). The two players were able to established coordination
of quantities over time. Player 5 notes that in the beginning her behavior
was characterized by profit maximization which changed towards the middle
of the game to what she referred to as stable profits (stable in the sense of
equal payoff distribution at the Cournot quantity). Player 15 writes that he
was interested in signaling cooperation and to ”educate” (punish or suggest
a better quantity) the opponent if he did not like her choice. Starting pe-
riod 6 both players successfully coordinated their strategies at the Cournot
quantity. Player 10 (Stackelberg leader) and player 20 (Stackelberg follower)
cooperated from the first to the last period at the Cournot quantity. Figures
35 and 36 show perfect Cournot play without an end effect. Player 10 notes
that he was looking for the largest payoff without provoking the opponent
to punish. Player 20 writes that she was interested in the highest payoff
possible but careful about how her choice would effect period two outcomes.
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Figure 29: Strategies Player 4 and 14 Period 1 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 30: Strategies Player 4 and 14 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 32: Strategies Player 2 and 12 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 33: Strategies Player 5 and 15 Period 1 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 34: Strategies Player 5 and 15 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 35: Strategies Player 10 and 20 Period 1 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 36: Strategies Player 10 and 20 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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The following results can be concluded by answering questions 3 and 4:
3. Are there differences in players quantity decision in period one and period
two that are in line with theoretical predictions?
For Stackelberg leaders, quantities in period two were significantly higher
than in period one. The opposite is true for Stackelberg followers, whose
quantities in period two were significantly lower than in period one. This
direction is predicted by theory, too. However, actual play was far from the
Stackelberg predictions and the pure strategy Nash equilibrium was played
only once out of 100 (10 games times ten duopolies). Cournot play was modal
for Stackelberg leaders and Stackelberg followers, suggesting that theoretical
prediction fail to explain behavior in this particular setup. The reason for
the quantity differences in period one and period two may be explained by
fairness considerations and inequality aversion. So, the answer is: Yes, there
are large differences and Cournot quantities appear to be a much better pre-
dictor than absolute profit maximizing Stackelberg quantities.
4. Do players try to coordinate behavior in such a way that may be called
inequality averse? In this case I expect to see cooperation and punishment
attempts.
One may wonder why Cournot play is modal at 39 out of 100 cases (consist-
ing of perfect Cournot play), considering players were easily able to identify
their dominant strategy. So, why did Stackelberg leaders not use their first
movers advantage, any more than they did, to outperform their competition?
The answer lies in fairness considerations, punishment for bad behavior, and
reward for good behavior. This may be indicated by the 27 cases of relative
profit maximizing quantity choices of Stackelberg followers in period one.
Indeed, 12 out of 20 players noted that they either were afraid of punishment
or considered punishment for bad behavior as a key motivator for choosing
certain quantities. Investing into cost-saving technologies, and thus, lowering
marginal cost for the next period appeared to not result in more competitive
play indicating, once again, that fairness considerations influenced players
decisions more so than dominant strategies, resulting in Cournot play being
modal. To answer the question: Yes, players do coordinate behavior and
cooperation is observed.
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6.3 Income Comparison
This last results subsection is designed to analyzing the payoffs in the two
treatments. Theory predicts that the sequential moves model yields slightly
higher average payoffs than the simultaneous moves model, i.e. the mixed
strategy equilibrium payoff in the Cournot game is 2870 while the Stackel-
berg leader earns an equilibrium payoff of 4550 and the Stackelberg follower
earns, in equilibrium, 1300. I averaged the equilibrium payoff for first and
second mover resulting in expected equilibrium payoff outcome in the Stack-
elberg model of 2955, which is slightly higher than the Cournot prediction.
Figures 37 and 38 depict the average per player payoff including theorized
outcomes. In general I would expect an average payoffs in the Stackelberg
game to be higher than in the Cournot game, due to its more competitive
experimental results. Indeed, comparing averages in each game by means
of a Mann-Whitney U-test across both Cournot and Stackelberg treatment
shows that payoffs in the Stackelberg game are significantly larger than in
the Cournot game (***at the 1% level)19. Mean play in the Cournot game
(µC = 2162) was below the the theoretical prediction of 2870, which suggest
that play was more competitive than predicted by theory. This was already
suggest earlier when I analyzed quantities.
The Stackelberg game depicts large deviations from theorized outcomes.
Overall and combining Stackelberg leaders and followers, the average payoff
in the sequential moves game is 2591. Comparing this result to the averaged
theorized outcome
(
piStacklead+piStackfollow
2
= 2955
)
it can be reported that the
experimental result shows slightly lower payoffs than predicted by theory.
However, when considering Stacklberg leaders and Stackelberg followers sep-
arately large difference emerge. The experimental results show that Stackel-
berg leaders earn on average 2676 compared to 4550 (theoretical prediction)
and Stackelberg followers earn 2507 compared to 1300 (theoretical predic-
tion). Why is there such large discrepancy between experiment and theory?
The answer is that this falls right in line with inequality averse preferences,
punishment of Stackelberg followers, and fear of punishment by Stackelberg
leaders. These preferences result in a much more equal payoff distributing
between first and second mover than predicted by theory.
19Again, I manually compute the Mann-Whitney U-test without the use of statistical
software, see table 11.
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Table 11: Payoff comparison between the simultaneous moves game and the
sequential moves game.
The following results can be concluded by answering question 5:
5. Are there payoff differences between the treatments and do payoffs deviate
from theorized outcomes?
Yes and Yes/No! Yes, as payoffs in the Stackelberg game are significantly
larger than in the Cournot game. This is due to the increased competitiveness
in Cournot game, where average payoffs fall short of theoretical prediction
and the establishment of coordination in the Stackelberg game. Yes/No, as
theory does predict slightly larger payoffs in Stackelberg model than in the
Cournot model but it does not predict the rather narrow difference in pay-
offs between Stackelberg leaders and Stackelberg followers due to successful
coordination of behavior around the Cournot quantities.
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7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation I strive to gain a deeper insight into how and why firms
act spitefully, i.e. select quantities in oligopoly quantity games that result in
lower absolute payoffs (compared to an absolute profit maximum) for them-
selves if it results in even lower absolute profits for their opponent. I set up
a 2-period model in which players have a possibility to lower marginal cost
after period one to produce cheaper in period two, thus gaining the opportu-
nity to earn larger profits in period two and increase market share. Firms are
able to lower marginal cost whenever they outperformed their competition in
terms of profit, i.e. whenever they show positive relative profits. The idea is
that whenever firms earn the same profit, both firms, by assumption, could
invest the same amount into cost-saving technologies and lower marginal
cost by the same degree. Only if one firm has an advantage over the other
firm, in terms of profit, will it be able to invest more than its competitor
and consequently produce cheaper due to lower marginal cost. Truly spiteful
players choose relative profit maximizing strategies in both periods, as they
receive satisfaction form beating their opponent, while selectively spiteful
player will show a different behavior in either period. If a firm is spiteful in
order to gain competitive advantage, thus securing its long-term position in
the market, then period one will consist of relative profit maximizing behav-
ior while period two, as no more lowering of marginal cost is possible, will
consist of absolute profit maximizing behavior. This may be interpreted as a
firms ultimate quest towards monopolistic power, changing spiteful behavior
to something inherently absolute rather than relative, in a sense that firms
merely forgo myopic best responses in order to maximize absolute profits in
the long run by achieving a monopolistic position in the market, compare
Rosenthal et al. (1984) [34]. It follows that choosing relative profit maximiz-
ing strategies in the short-run, i.e. spiteful behavior, is a means to maximize
long-run absolute profits.
In order to test the 2-period model, I decided to run two laboratory experi-
ments, with the first experiments consisting of a Cournot quantity game in
which players select quantities simultaneously, and the second one a Stackel-
berg game, in which players made their choices sequentially. Theory predicts
a mixed strategy outcome in the Cournot game (with the Cournot quantity
being selected 71% of the time) while the Stackelberg model resulted in one
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies consisting of absolute
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profit maximizing quantities throughout. Experimental results show that,
in the Cournot game, period one was significantly more competitive than
period two, i.e. quantities in period one were significantly higher than in pe-
riod two. Walrasian quantities were by far the strongest quantity in period
one while Cournot quantities dominated period two. These results suggest
that players are selectively spiteful, i.e. selecting relative profit maximizing
strategies whenever they have a chance to increase future profits or to in-
sulate against loosing market share against their opponent. As period two
is dominated by Cournot play one may infer that players behave spitefully
whenever it serves a particular purpose, here that purpose is lower marginal
cost for future periods, thus, indirectly, achieving maximal absolute profits
in the future. It follows that spiteful behavior is more than the gain in utility
over beating ones’ competition.
Experimental results in the sequential moves game show large discrepancies
between theorized outcomes and experimental data. As mentioned above,
theory predicted absolute profit maximizing behavior throughout the entire
game, meaning the Stackelberg leader can fully use its first mover’s advan-
tage to capture two-thirds of the market for herself, resulting in an even
more extreme payoff split in period two, due to the lower marginal cost of
the Stackelberg leader in period two. However, this did not happen in the
experiment. Stackelberg leaders’ quantities fall way below theoretical predic-
tion while Stackelberg followers’ quantities are much higher than theorized.
Cournot play was modal in the Stackelberg game. This can be explained
by considering other-regarding preferences, which appear to dominate strict
profit maximizing behavior, in that, Stackelberg leaders’ and Stackelberg fol-
lowers’ preferences for an equal payoff distribution may trump absolute profit
maxima. Additionally, Stackelberg leaders had to fear possible punishment
by Stackelberg followers for playing above Cournot quantity strategies, as
Cournot quantities, when chosen by both players would result in equal pay-
off for both players. In fact, in period one, Stackelberg followers chose a
punishment quantity 27 times, which may have been the attempt to change
Stackelberg leaders’ minds about choosing quantities that result in an un-
equal payoff split. Thus, in the sequential moves game, spiteful behavior was
selected to serve a purpose other than gaining utility from just being better in
relative terms. Spiteful play, i.e. relative profit maximizing strategies, were
selected to punish Stackelberg leaders if they used their first movers advan-
tage to gain larger profits than Stackelberg followers. This was quite effective
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as first and second movers output where much closer to each other than to
the outcome predicted by theory - as Weimann (1994) [50] points out, ”...co-
operation is a real fact of human societies...” Comparing payoffs between the
two treatments, Stackelberg players, on average, earned significantly larger
profits than Cournot players, suggesting that the less competitive outcome in
Stackelberg model beats Cournot competition, where especially first period
outcomes were very competitive with Walrasian quantities most frequently
selected.
What is the contribution of this dissertation? Firstly, to the best of this
author’s knowledge no other article has tested this particular model experi-
mentally, which in itself makes for an interesting approach. Secondly, I set
out to gain a deeper understanding of how and when firms play more com-
petitively, choose spiteful strategies, and when firms rather cooperate and
sustain from competition in favor of equal payoffs. With this in mind, I
was able to show that firms are very much aware of when and when not to
behave in accordance with relative profit maximization. This I was able to
show in the simultaneous moves game where first period choices were much
more competitive than choices in period two, suggesting long-term profit
maximization and the fear of being outperformed by one’s competitor more
important than myopic best replies and receiving utility from simply beating
one’s competition. In the sequential moves model I showed that players used
relative profit maximizing quantities to punish Stackelberg leaders if they
tried to exploit Stackelberg followers by using their first movers advantage.
Here, too, relative profit maximizing quantities are not chosen for the pure
joy of beating competition, but to ensure equal payoffs, in line with prefer-
ences exhibiting inequality aversion. Thus, I was able to gain some insight
into why and when players choose to exhibit spiteful behavior.
There are certainly short-comings and further research needs to be done
in order to extrapolate to other settings. For example, it would be interest-
ing to see how players behave in a Stackelberg game wherein players did not
play the same opponent in every game. Punishment would still be possible,
however, the attempt to change a Stackelberg leaders minds about playing
her leader’s advantage is somewhat lost, as in each game players face a new
opponent. Another factor that may change things is time. One could open
the time horizon to more than just two time periods allowing for more periods
of potential investments into cost-saving technologies to build market share.
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Also, one may consider running the simultaneous moves game in fixed pairs
throughout the entire experiment to see if coordination changes first period
results to more Cournot play, and consequently higher payoffs for both play-
ers, moving closer to the experimental Stackelberg outcome. One could also
allow for players to chose if they want to invest into cost-saving technologies
instead of making it non-optional, this would add a finer understanding of
the difference between gaining utility from beating competition and gaining
utility from future absolute profits. As always, there is much more that can
be research adding to the ever growing field of behavioral economics.
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A Experimental Instruction (Cournot Game)
Experimental Instruction in German (all experiments were conducted in Ger-
man language)
Willkommen zum Experiment! (Bitte Sprechen Sie mit niemandem außer den
Mitarbeitern, ansonsten mu¨ssen wir Sie von dem Experiment ausschlieen)
Bitte lesen Sie in den na¨chsten Minuten die Instruktionen stumm mit, wa¨hrend
wir Sie laut vorlesen. Wenn Sie danach eine Frage haben, melden Sie sich
bitte und ein Mitarbeiter wird Ihnen helfen. In dem Laborexperiment, an
dem Sie jetzt teilnehmen, ko¨nnen Sie in Abha¨ngigkeit Ihrer Entscheidun-
gen und der Entscheidungen Ihrer Mitspieler Bargeld in everdienen. Ihre
Entscheidungen im Experiment treffen Sie anonym. Bitte stellen Sie ihre
Taschen an die Seite und schalten Sie ihre Telefone aus! Im Experiment wer-
den Sie Entscheidungen in 10 Spielen treffen. Jedes dieser Spiele besteht aus
2 Perioden. Nach jedem Spiel bekommen Sie einen neuen Gegner zugewiesen,
der per Zufall ausgewa¨hlt wurde. In den 10 Spielen werden Sie nie zweimal
gegen den gleichen Gegner spielen.
Die Entscheidungssituation
Sie sind Eigentu¨mer einer Firma in einem Markt der aus 2 Firmen besteht,
d.h. Ihre Firma und die Firma Ihres Gegners. Beide Firmen produzieren
ein identisches Gut und haben in Periode 1 identische Produktionskosten,
die 40 Euro betragen. Ihre Aufgabe ist es sich fu¨r eine Produktionsmenge
zu entscheiden, die Sie auf dem Markt verkaufen. Ihr Gegner tut das Gle-
iche. Die zur Verfu¨gung stehenden Produktionsmengen sind in Periode 1
fu¨r beide Spieler identisch und bestehen aus 30, 40, 50 oder 60. Der Markt
ist so ausgerichtet, dass alle produzierten Einheiten auch verkauft werden.
Nachdem beide Spieler ihre Entscheidung in Periode 1 getroffen haben, wer-
den Sie gebeten auch fr Periode 2 eine Produktionsmenge auszuwa¨hlen. Die
Produktionsmengen die in Periode 2 zur Auswahl stehen ergeben sich aus
den Produktionsmengen aus Periode 1. Sie ko¨nnen die Produktionsmengen
und Auszahlungen in Periode 2 der Auszahlungstabelle fr Periode 2 in Ihrem
Excelprogramm entnehmen. Neben diesen Instruktionen finden Sie an Ihrem
Platz noch eine Informationstabelle fr Periode 1, einen Stift, einen Fragebo-
gen und Ihren Entscheidungsbogen. Folgende Informationen ko¨nnen Sie der
Informationstabelle fr Periode 1 entnehmen: Den Gewinn beider Firmen, die
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mo¨glichen kostensenkenden Investitionen beider Firmen, die Auszahlungen
beider Spieler und die Produktionskosten fr Periode 2.
Erkla¨rungen zu den Positionen auf der Informationstabelle:
Gewinn: Dies ist der Gewinn Ihrer Firma auf dem Markt, der von Ihrer und
der Ihres Gegners gewa¨hlten Produktionsmenge abha¨ngt. Investition: Falls
Ihre Firma mehr Gewinn als die Firma Ihres Gegners erwirtschaftet, wird fu¨r
Sie die Ha¨lfte der Differenz zwischen den Gewinnen in kostensenkende Tech-
nologien investiert, so dass Sie in Periode 2 gu¨nstiger produzieren ko¨nnen
und einen kompetitiven Vorteil erlangen. Falls Ihre Firma weniger Gewinn
macht als die Ihres Gegners investieren Sie nichts und haben in Periode 2
die gleichen Produktionskosten wie in Periode 1 (in diesem Fall investiert Ihr
Gegner in kostensenkende Technologien und kann in Periode 2 gu¨nstiger als
Sie produzieren). Falls beide Firmen den gleichen Gewinn erwirtschaften,
kann keine der beiden Firmen investieren und beide Firmen haben die gle-
ichen Produktionskosten wie schon in Periode 1 (40 Euro). Auszahlung: Die
Auszahlung ist das Geld, was Sie von uns ausgezahlt bekommen. Es ist der
Gewinn Ihrer Firma minus der Investition. Produktionskosten fu¨r Periode 2:
Die Kosten der Periode 2 sind abha¨ngig von der Investition in Periode 1. Je
mehr Sie in Periode 1 investieren ko¨nnen, desto geringer sind die Kosten in
Periode 2, d.h. je gro¨ßer die positive Differenz zwischen dem Gewinn Ihrer
Firma und dem Gewinn Ihres Gegners ist, desto gu¨nstiger produzieren Sie
in Periode 2 und desto mehr ko¨nnen Sie in Periode 2 verdienen.
Die auf Ihrem Computer angelegte Excel-Datei ist dazu gedacht, dass Sie
ein besseres Versta¨ndnis fr das Spiel bekommen. Es wird Ihnen in Ihrer
Entscheidungsfindung helfen. Sie ko¨nnen jede mo¨gliche Situation fu¨r Pe-
riode 1 simulieren und sehen welche mo¨glichen Szenarien sich dadurch fu¨r
Sie in Periode 2 ergeben. Bitte u¨ben Sie sehr sorgfa¨ltig und intensiv bevor
wir mit dem eigentlichen Experiment beginnen. Generell ko¨nnen Sie als lei-
tenden Faden folgendes erwarten: Je gro¨ßer Ihre Investition in Periode 1,
d.h. je ho¨her der Gewinn Ihrer Firma u¨ber dem Ihres Gegners liegt, umso
gro¨ßer wird Ihre Auszahlung in Periode 2 ausfallen. Falls Ihre Firma und
die ihres Gegners in Periode 1 den gleichen Gewinn erwirtschaften, ist die
Entscheidungssituation in Periode 2 die gleiche wie in Periode 1. Je gro¨ßer
die Investition Ihres Gegners, d.h. je ho¨her der Gewinn Ihres Gegners u¨ber
Ihrem liegt, desto geringer ist die mo¨gliche Auszahlung fr Sie in Periode 2.
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Entscheidungsprozess und Auszahlungsregel
1. Sie erhalten zur Teilnahme an dem Experiment 7 Euro
2. In jeder Periode erhalten Sie zusa¨tzlich die von Ihnen erwirtschaftete
Auszahlung (seien Sie vorsichtig, es sind auch negative Auszahlung mo¨glich
wie Sie Ihrer Simulation entnehmen ko¨nnen. In diesem Fall wu¨rde sich Ihre
Auszahlung verringern.) Beispiel 1. Falls Sie und Ihr Gegner in Periode 1
beide die Produktionsmenge 30 wa¨hlen, ist der Gewinn beider Firmen 1.80
EUR in Periode 1. Keiner der beiden Firmen investiert, da beide Firmen
den gleichen Gewinn erwirtschaftet haben. Ihre Auszahlung und die Ihres
Gegners ist auch 1.80 EUR, da Gewinn abzgl. der Investition (1.80 0.00)
gleich 1.80 EUR sind. Beide Firmen haben die gleichen Kosten in Periode 2,
wie auch schon in Periode 1, na¨mlich 40 EUR. Bespiel 2. Falls Sie in Peri-
ode 1, 60 produzieren wa¨hrend Ihr Gegner 40 produziert, erwirtschaftet Ihre
Firma 1.20 EUR wa¨hrend die Firma Ihres Gegners 0.80 EUR erwirtschaftet.
Ihre Firma investiert die Ha¨lfte der Differenz (0.20 EUR). Ihre Auszahlung
ist 1.00 EUR (1.20 0.20) und die Ihres Gegners 0.80 EUR. Ihre Produk-
tionskosten in Periode 2 sind 26.67 EUR wa¨hrend die Ihres Gegner 40 EUR
betragen. Beispiel 3. Sie: 30 Einheiten Ihr Gegner: 50 Einheiten Folgende
Ergebnisse ergeben sich fu¨r Periode 1: (Graphic, hier nicht beigefu¨gt)
Sie ko¨nnen sehen, dass die Auszahlungstabelle fu¨r Periode 2 von den Entschei-
dungen in Periode 1 abha¨ngen. Je gro¨ßer die Investition in Periode 1, desto
ho¨her die mo¨glichen Auszahlungen in Periode 2. Bitte machen Sie sich mit
dem Programm vertraut, da Ihre Entscheidungen davon abha¨ngen. Sowie
Sie sich fu¨r eine Produktionsmenge entschieden haben, tragen Sie diese in
Ihren Entscheidungsbogen und in der Ecxeltabelle ein. Nachdem wir Ihnen
die Menge Ihres Gegners mittgeteilt haben, tragen Sie diese auch in die Ex-
celtabelle ein. Sie sehen jetzt welche Mo¨glichkeiten sich in Periode 2 ergeben.
Nachdem Sie sich fu¨r eine Produktionsmenge entschieden haben, tragen Sie
diese auch in den Entscheidungsbogen ein. Wie zuvor, erga¨nzen wir Ihren
Entscheidungsbogen um die Menge Ihres Gegners sowie die Auszahlungen.
Danach startet der gleiche Prozess (Spiel 2) mit einem neuen Gegner. Zur
Eingabe der Menge brauchen Sie nur auf das jeweilige Feld zu klicken und
die Menge aus der Liste auszuwa¨hlen. Bitte machen Sie keine Eintra¨ge mit
Hilfe der Tastatur, da es sonst zu einer Fehlermeldung kommt. Bitte scheuen
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Sie nicht uns jeder Zeit Fragen zu stellen, auch noch so triviale, denn es ist
entscheidend, dass alle Spieler das Experiment verstehen. Bitte fragen Sie
nie ihren Nachbarn oder einen anderen Spieler, weil dadurch die gesammelten
Daten unbrauchbar werden. Bitte heben Sie bei Fragen die Hand und wir
werden zu Ihnen an den Platz kommen. Wir werden Ihnen jetzt die Excel-
Datei erkla¨ren.
B Experimental Instruction (Stackelberg Game)
Experimental Instruction in German (all experiments were conducted in Ger-
man language)
Willkommen zum Experiment!
(Bitte Sprechen Sie mit niemandem auer den Mitarbeitern, ansonsten mu¨ssen
wir Sie von dem Experiment ausschlieen) Bitte lesen Sie in den na¨chsten
Minuten die Instruktionen stumm mit, wa¨hrend wir Sie laut vorlesen. Wenn
Sie danach eine Frage haben, melden Sie sich bitte und ein Mitarbeiter wird
Ihnen helfen. In dem Laborexperiment, an dem Sie jetzt teilnehmen, ko¨nnen
Sie in Abha¨ngigkeit Ihrer Entscheidungen und der Entscheidungen Ihrer Mit-
spieler Bargeld in everdienen. Ihre Entscheidungen im Experiment treffen
Sie anonym. Bitte stellen Sie ihre Taschen an die Seite und schalten Sie
ihre Telefone aus! Im Experiment werden Sie Entscheidungen in 10 Spielen
treffen. Jedes dieser Spiele besteht aus 2 Perioden. Sie spielen im gesamte
Spiel gegen den gleichen Gegner, der per Zufall ausgewa¨hlt wurde.
Die Entscheidungssituation
Sie sind Eigentu¨mer einer Firma in einem Markt der aus 2 Firmen besteht,
d.h. Ihre Firma und die Firma Ihres Gegners. Beide Firmen produzieren
ein identisches Gut und haben in Periode 1 identische Produktionskosten,
die 40 Euro betragen. Allerdings entscheiden die beiden Firmen sich zu
unteschiedlichen Zeitpunkten u¨ber ihre Produktionsmengen, d.h. eine Firma
entscheidet sich zuerest fu¨r eine Menge (Erstziehende). Die erstziehende
Firma wurde per Zufall ausgewa¨hlt und bleibt erstziehende Firma fu¨r das
gesamte Spiel. Nachdem sich die erstziehende Firma fu¨r eine Menge entschieden
hat, wird die zweitziehende Firma u¨ber die Menge der erstziehenden Firma
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informiert. Danach entscheidet sich auch die zweitziehende Firma fu¨r eine
Produktionsmenge. Die Firma die den gro¨ßeren Gewinn erwirtschaftet, in-
vestiert in kostensenkende Technologien und kann in Periode 2 gu¨nstiger
produzieren und einen gro¨ßeren Gewinn erwirtschaften als der Gegner.
Die zur Verfu¨gung stehenden Produktionsmengen sind in Periode 1 fu¨r den
erstziehenden Spieler 30, 40, 50 oder 60. Die Menge fu¨r den Zweitziehen-
den ergeben sich aus der Menge des Erstziehenden. Der Markt ist so aus-
gerichtet, dass alle produzierten Einheiten auch verkauft werden. Nachdem
beide Spieler ihre Entscheidung in Periode 1 getroffen haben, werden Sie
gebeten auch fr Periode 2 eine Produktionsmenge auszuwa¨hlen. Die Pro-
duktionsmengen, die in Periode 2 zur Auswahl stehen, ergeben sich aus den
Produktionsmengen aus Periode 1. Sie ko¨nnen die Produktionsmengen und
Auszahlungen in Periode 1 und 2 Ihrem Excelprogramm entnehmen. Der
Ablauf in Periode 2 ist identische mit dem in Periode 1, d.h. der erstziehende
Spieler entscheidet zuerst und der zweitziehende Spieler nachdem sie u¨ber
die Menge des Erstziehenden informiert wurde. Neben diesen Instruktio-
nen finden Sie an Ihrem Platz noch einen Stift, einen Fragebogen und Ihren
Entscheidungsbogen.
Die auf Ihrem Computer angelegte Excel-Datei gibt Ihnen Auskunft u¨ber alle
mo¨glichen Situationen die sich aus den Mengen von Erst- und Zweitziehen-
dem ergeben. Sie ko¨nnen jede mo¨gliche Situation fr Periode 1 simulieren und
sehen welche mo¨glichen Szenarien sich dadurch fu¨r Sie in Periode 2 ergeben.
Bitte u¨ben Sie sehr sorgfa¨ltig und intensiv bevor wir mit dem eigentlichen
Experiment beginnen. Generell ko¨nnen Sie als leitenden Faden folgendes er-
warten: Je gro¨ßer Ihre Investition in Periode 1, d.h. je ho¨her der Gewinn
Ihrer Firma u¨ber dem Ihres Gegners liegt, umso gro¨ßer wird Ihre Auszahlung
in Periode 2 ausfallen. Falls Ihre Firma und die ihres Gegners in Periode 1
den gleichen Gewinn erwirtschaften, ist die Entscheidungssituation in Peri-
ode 2 die gleiche wie in Periode 1. Je gro¨ßer die Investition Ihres Gegners,
d.h. je ho¨her der Gewinn Ihres Gegners u¨ber Ihrem liegt, desto geringer
ist die mo¨gliche Auszahlung fr Sie in Periode 2. Erkla¨rungen zu den Posi-
tionen in der Excel-Datei: Ihre Menge: Die Produktionsmenge fu¨r die Sie
sich entscheiden ko¨nnen. Menge des Gegners: Die Produktionsmenge fu¨r
die sich Ihr Gegner entscheiden kann. Ergebnis Periode 1 Gewinn: Dies ist
der Gewinn Ihrer Firma auf dem Markt, der von Ihrer und der Ihres Geg-
ners gewa¨hlten Produktionsmenge abha¨ngt. Investition: Falls Ihre Firma
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mehr Gewinn als die Firma Ihres Gegners erwirtschaftet, wird fu¨r Sie die
Ha¨lfte der Differenz zwischen den Gewinnen in kostensenkende Technologien
investiert, so dass Sie in Periode 2 gu¨nstiger produzieren ko¨nnen und einen
kompetitiven Vorteil erlangen. Falls Ihre Firma weniger Gewinn macht als
die Ihres Gegners investieren Sie nichts und haben in Periode 2 die gleichen
Produktionskosten wie in Periode 1 (in diesem Fall investiert Ihr Gegner
in kostensenkende Technologien und kann in Periode 2 gu¨nstiger als Sie pro-
duzieren). Falls beide Firmen den gleichen Gewinn erwirtschaften, kann keine
der beiden Firmen investieren und beide Firmen haben die gleichen Produk-
tionskosten wie schon in Periode 1 (40 Euro). Auszahlung: Die Auszahlung
ist das Geld, was Sie von uns ausgezahlt bekommen. Es ist der Gewinn Ihrer
Firma minus der Investition. Produktionskosten fu¨r Periode 2: Die Kosten
der Periode 2 sind abha¨ngig von der Investition in Periode 1. Je mehr Sie
in Periode 1 investieren ko¨nnen, desto geringer sind die Kosten in Periode 2,
d.h. je gro¨ßer die positive Differenz zwischen dem Gewinn Ihrer Firma und
dem Gewinn Ihres Gegners ist, desto gu¨nstiger produzieren Sie in Periode 2
und desto mehr ko¨nnen Sie in Periode 2 verdienen.
Entscheidungsprozess und Auszahlungsregel
1. Sie erhalten zur Teilnahme an dem Experiment 7 Euro
2. In jeder Periode erhalten Sie zusa¨tzlich die von Ihnen erwirtschaftete
Auszahlung (seien Sie vorsichtig, es sind auch negative Auszahlung mo¨glich
wie Sie Ihrer Simulation entnehmen ko¨nnen. In diesem Fall wu¨rde sich Ihre
Auszahlung verringern.) Beispiel 1. Falls sich die erstziehende Firma in Pe-
riode 1 fu¨r eine Produktionsmenge von 40 entscheidet und die zweitziehende
Frima in Periode 1 auch 40 produziert, ist der Gewinn beider Firmen 1.60
EUR in Periode 1. Keiner der beiden Firmen investiert, da beide Firmen
den gleichen Gewinn erwirtschaftet haben. Ihre Auszahlung und die Ihres
Gegners ist auch 1.60 EUR, da Gewinn abzgl. der Investition (1.60 0.00)
gleich 1.60 EUR sind. Beide Firmen haben die gleichen Kosten in Peri-
ode 2, wie auch schon in Periode 1, na¨mlich 40 EUR. Bespiel 2. Falls
der Erstziehende in Periode 1, 60 produziert wa¨hrend der Zweitziehende 30
produziert, ist die Auszahlung fu¨r den Zuerstziehende 1.35 EUR wa¨hrend
der Zweitziehenden 0.90 EUR verdient. Die Produktionskosten in Periode
2 sind 20 EUR fu¨r den Erstziehenden und 40 EUR fu¨r den Zweitziehen-
den. Dies bedeutet das der Erstziehende einen grossen Vorteill in Periode
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2 hat, wie Sie es der Auszahlungstabelle fr Periode 2 entnehmen ko¨nnen.
Beispiel 3. Erstziehender: 50 Einheiten Zweitziehender: 60 Einheiten Fol-
gende Ergebnisse ergeben sich fr Periode 1: Auszahlung Erstziehender: 0.50
EUR Auszahlung Zweitziehender: 0.55 EUR Kosten in Periode 2 Erstziehen-
der: 40 EUR Kosten in Periode 2 Zweitziehender: 33.33 EUR
Sie ko¨nnen sehen, dass die Auszahlungstabelle fr Periode 2 von den Entschei-
dungen in Periode 1 abha¨ngen. Je gro¨ßer die Investition in Periode 1, desto
ho¨her die mo¨glichen Auszahlungen in Periode 2. Bitte machen Sie sich mit
dem Programm vertraut, da Ihre Entscheidungen davon abha¨ngen.
Sowie Sie sich fu¨r eine Produktionsmenge entschieden haben, tragen Sie
diese in Ihren Entscheidungsbogen und in der Ecxeltabelle ein. Fu¨r den
Zweitziehenden bedeutet dies natu¨rlich, dass sie erst die Entscheidung des
Erstziehenden abwarten muss bevor sie sich selbst entscheiden kann. Nach-
dem wir Ihnen die Menge Ihres Gegners mittgeteilt haben, tragen Sie diese
auch in die Exceltabelle ein.
Sie sehen jetzt welche Mo¨glichkeiten sich in Periode 2 ergeben. Nachdem
Sie sich fu¨r eine Produktionsmenge entschieden haben, tragen Sie diese auch
in den Entscheidungsbogen ein (Zweitzieher mu¨ssen wie schon in Periode 1
auf die Menge vom Gegner warten). Wie zuvor, erga¨nzen wir Ihren Entschei-
dungsbogen um die Menge Ihres Gegners sowie die Auszahlungen. Danach
startet der gleiche Prozess (Spiel 2) mit dem gleichen Gegner. Zur Eingabe
der Menge brauchen Sie nur auf das jeweilige Feld zu klicken und die Menge
aus der Liste auszuwa¨hlen. Bitte machen Sie keine Eintra¨ge mit Hilfe der
Tastatur, da es sonst zu einer Fehlermeldung kommt. Bitte scheuen Sie nicht
uns jeder Zeit Fragen zu stellen, auch noch so triviale, denn es ist entschei-
dend, dass alle Spieler das Experiment verstehen. Bitte fragen Sie nie ihren
Nachbarn oder einen anderen Spieler, weil dadurch die gesammelten Daten
unbrauchbar werden. Bitte heben Sie bei Fragen die Hand und wir werden
zu Ihnen an den Platz kommen. Wir werden Ihnen jetzt die Excel-Datei
erkla¨ren.
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C Questionnaire Simultaneous Moves
Fragebogen
Frage 1. Sie entscheiden sich in Periode 1 fu¨r die Produktionsmenge 30,
wa¨hrend Ihr Gegner sich fu¨r 60 entscheidet. In Periode 2, was ist die ho¨chste
mo¨gliche Auszahlung fu¨r:
Sie:
Ihren Gegner:
Und was ist die niedrigste mo¨gliche Auszahlung fu¨r: Sie: Ihren Gegner:
Frage 2. Falls Sie und Ihr Gegner in Periode 1 beide 50 spielen, wie hoch ist
die Auszahlung in Periode 1 fu¨r: Sie:
Ihren Gegner:
Frage 3. Wie hoch sind Ihre Kosten in Periode 2, wenn Sie sich in Peri-
ode 1 fu¨r 60 entscheiden, und Ihr Gegner 40 spielt?
Frage 4. Sie entscheiden sich fu¨r die Produktionsmenge 50 in Periode 1,
wa¨hrend Ihr Gegner 40 spielt. Welche Produktionsmengen stehen Ihnen zur
Verfu¨gung in Periode 2 und wie hoch sind Ihre Produktionskosten?
Produktionsmengen:
Kosten:
D Questionnaire Sequential Moves
Fragebogen
Frage 1. Der Zuerstziehende entscheiden sich in Periode 1 fu¨r die Produk-
tionsmenge 60, worauf sich der Zweitziehende fr 30 entscheidet. In Periode
2, was ist die ho¨chste mo¨gliche Auszahlung fu¨r:
Erstziehenden:
Zweitziehenden:
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Und was ist die niedrigste mo¨gliche Auszahlung fu¨r:
Erstziehenden:
Zweitziehenden:
Frage 2. Falls der Erstziehende 40 spielt und der Zeitziehende darauf auch
40 in Periode 1 spielt, wie hoch ist die Auszahlung in Periode 1 fu¨r:
Erstziehenden:
Zweitziehenden:
Frage 3. Wie hoch sind Ihre Kosten in Periode 2, wenn sich der Zuer-
stziehende in Periode 1 fu¨r 50 entscheidet, und der Zweitziehende in Periode
1 35 spielt?
Erstziehenden:
Zweitziehenden:
Frage 4. Der Erstziehende entscheiden sich fu¨r die Produktionsmenge 60
in Periode 1, wa¨hrend der Zweitziehende 45 spielt. Welche Produktionsmen-
gen stehen dem Erstziehenden zur Verfu¨gung in Periode 2 und wie hoch sind
dessen Produktionskosten?
Produktionsmengen:
Kosten:
Zu Frage 4. Welche Produktionsmengen stehen dem Zweitziehenden in Peri-
ode 2 zur Verfu¨gung wenn der Erstziehende sich in Periode 2 fu¨r 70 entschei-
det?
Produktionsmengen
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E Record Sheet
Menge Auszahlung Menge Auszahlung
Periode 1
Periode 2
Periode 1
Periode 2
Periode 1
Periode 2
Periode 1
Periode 2
Periode 1
Periode 2
Periode 1
Periode 2
Periode 1
Periode 2
Periode 1
Periode 2
Periode 1
Periode 2
Periode 1
Periode 2
Teilen Sie uns bitte kurz mit, was Grundlage ihrer Entscheidung in Periode 1 und in Periode 2 war.
Periode 1:
Periode 2:
Spiel 10
Spiel 2
Spiel 3
Spiel 4
Spiel 5
Spiel 6
Spiel 7
Spiel 1
Sie Ihr Gegner
Spiel 8
Spiel 9
Tragen Sie in dieser Spalte 
Ihre Produktionsmengen ein. 
Die anderen Spalten werden 
von uns ausgefüllt! 
Spielernummer (Platznummer):  
 
Geschlecht: 
 
Alter: 
 
Studiengang: 
 
Semester: 
Figure 39: Average payoffs per player in the Cournot game.
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F Experimenter’s Record Sheet
Figure 40: Example of experimenter’s record sheet
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G Payoff Table Period 1 (Cournot Game)
Figure 41: Payoff Table Cournot game.
147
H Math Details on the Experimental Model
H.1 Cournot
The first step here is to derive the standard Cournot results, which will show
best responses as a one shot game.
max
yi
pii = P (Y )yi − C(yi) (276)
substituting the above information and deriving best reply functions:
max
yi
pii = (160− yi − y−i) yi − 40yi (277)
the first oder condition is:
∂pii
∂yi
= 120− 2yi − y−i = 0 (278)
Due to symmetry both firms share the same optimal reply function:
Ri : yi(y−i) = 60− 1
2
y−i (279)
If both firms play their optimal replies, the market brings about the following
outcome:
y∗i = y
∗
−i = 40 (280)
pi∗i = pi
∗
−i = 1600 (281)
In order to achieve maximal investment in period one, to lower cost in period
two by the maximal amount, a firm will have to outperform the other by the
greatest difference in profits possible, thus, it will maximize relative profits
in period one.
H.2 Walras
A relative profit maximizer will produce that quantity that will achieve the
greatest distance in terms of profit between itself and it’s competition:
max
yi
(pii − pi−i) = max
yi
piRi , where R stands for relative (282)
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substituting the above information and deriving best reply functions:
max
yi
piRi = (160− yi − y−i) yi − 40yi − [(160− yi − y−i) y−i − 40y−i] (283)
the first oder condition is:
∂piRi
∂yi
= 120− 2yi = 0 (284)
If both firms play their optimal replies, the market brings about the following
outcome:
y∗i = y
∗
−i = 60 (285)
P ∗(Y ) = 40 (286)
pi∗i = pi
∗
−i = 0 (287)
this is equivalent to perfect competition, and hence, the Walrasian outcome.
A quicker way to derive this result, due to symmetry, is simply equating
marginal cost and market price:
MC(yi) =
∂C(yi)
∂yi
= 40 = 160− Y = P (Y ) (288)
One can easily see that Y = 120 and, due to symmetry, both firms have
equal share in market output, i.e. yi =
1
2
Y = 60.
Thus far, I have derived strategies (Walrasian and Cournot) under a simul-
taneous move process. I will now continue and derive quantities under a
sequential move model.
H.3 Stackelberg
I assume firm i is the first mover (leader) and firm -i, subsequently, the second
mover (follower). The model is solved through backward induction and starts
by finding the optimal reply function of the follower:
max
y−i
pi−i = P (Y )y−i − C(y−i) (289)
substituting the above information and deriving the optimal reply function:
max
y−i
pi−i = (160− yi − y−i) y−i − 40y−i (290)
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the first oder condition is
∂pi−i
∂y−i
= 120− 2y−i − yi = 0 (291)
The follower’s optimal reply function is obviously the same as the one derived
under simultaneous Cournot (see above):
R−i : y−i(yi) = 60− 1
2
yi (292)
As the leader knows what the followers optimal reply is (assuming perfect
information), she will maximize her profits by substituting the follower’s
optimal reply function directly into her profit function:
max
yi
pii = (160− yi − y−i(yi)) yi − 40yi (293)
max
yi
pii =
[
160− yi −
(
60− 1
2
yi
)]
yi − 40yi (294)
∂pii
∂yi
= 60− yi = 0 (295)
The leader in optimum will choose :
y∗i = 60 (296)
The followers quantity can easily be derived by substituting the leaders op-
timal quantity into her reaction function:
R−i : y−i(y∗i ) = 60−
1
2
y∗i (297)
R−i : y−i(60) = 60− 1
2
60 (298)
Thus, the follower in optimum will choose :
y∗−i = 30 (299)
The leader’s profit in this Stackelberg model is:
pi∗i = 1800 (300)
While the follower’s profit is:
pi∗−i = 900 (301)
Solving the sequential moves model for maximum possible investment will
again rely on maximization in relative terms.
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H.4 Stackelberg in Relative Terms
The analysis, just like before, follows the backward induction process and
thus, starts by finding the optimal reply of the follower:
max
y−i
piR−i = (160− yi − y−i) y−i − 40y−i − [(160− yi − y−i) yi − 40yi] (302)
the first oder condition is:
∂piR−i
∂y−i
= 120− 2y−i = 0 (303)
The follower’s optimal reply function is, no surprise here, the same as the
one derived under simultaneous relative profit maximization (see above) and
independent of the leaders quantity choice:
y∗−i = 60 (304)
Thus, the leaders best strategy (in terms of relative performance), under
consideration of the followers optimal quantity choice (again assuming perfect
information), is derived by applying the followers optimal reply function
directly into the leaders profit function.
max
yi
piRi =
(
160− yi − y∗−i
)
yi − 40yi −
[(
160− yi − y∗−i
)
y∗−i − 40y∗−i
]
(305)
It should come as no surprise that the follower’s optimal quantity is also
60, as her quantity decision in this symmetric model is independent of the
followers output decision, and vice versa.
∂piRi
∂yi
= 120− 2yi = 0 (306)
Hence:
y∗i = 60 (307)
Again, this is the outcome under perfect competition leading to:
pi∗i = pi
∗
−i = 0 (308)
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H.5 Cournot Quantities in the Stackelberg Model
If the Stackelberg leader chooses 40, the Stackelberg follower’s absolute profit
maximizing best reply is:
max
yi
pii = [160− yi − 40] yi − 40yi (309)
∂pii
∂yi
= 80− 2yi = 0 (310)
The Stackelberg follower in optimum will choose:
y∗i = 40 (311)
which is the Cournot quantity. If the Stackelberg leader chooses 40, the
Stackelberg follower’s relative profit maximizing quantity is:
max
yi
piRi = (160− yi − 40) yi − 40yi − [(160− yi − 40) 40− 40 (40)] (312)
∂pii
∂yi
= 120− 2yi = 0 (313)
The Stackelberg follower in optimum will choose:
y∗i = 60 (314)
which is the Walrasian quantity of the Cournot game.
All that is left, is to complete the strategy options for the Cournot quan-
tity branch of the sequential moves game tree.
1. Period 1: (40,60) Period 2: (60,?)
The follower’s relative profit maximizing quantity:
max
y−i
piR−i = (160− yi − y−i) y−i− 26
2
3
y−i− [(160− yi − y−i) yi − 40yi] (315)
∂piR−i
∂y−i
= 133
1
3
− 2y−i = 0 (316)
y∗−i = 66
2
3
(317)
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The leaders relative profit maximizing quantity is:
max
yi
piRi =
(
160− yi − 662
3
)
yi − 40yi −
[(
160− yi − 662
3
)
yi − 262
3
66
2
3
]
(318)
∂piRi
∂yi
= 120− 2yi = 0 (319)
y∗i = 60 (320)
Aggregation over two periods yields:
Πi = pii,period1 + pii,period2 = 800− 400 = 400 (321)
analogously for the other firm:
Π−i = pi−i,period1 + pi−i,period2 = 1200 + 444
4
9
= 1644
4
9
(322)
2. Period 1: (40,60) Period 2: (60,?)
What is the follower’s optimal absolute reaction to the leader’s relative op-
timal choice?
max
y−i
pi−i = (160− yi − y−i) y−i − 262
3
y−i (323)
∂pi−i
∂y−i
= 133
1
3
− 2y−i − yi = 0 (324)
R−i : y−i(60) = 66
2
3
− 1
2
60 (325)
y∗−i = 36
2
3
(326)
Aggregation over two periods yields:
Πi = pii,period1 + pii,period2 = 800 + 1400 = 2200 (327)
analogously for the other firm:
Π−i = pi−i,period1 + pi−i,period2 = 1200 + 1344
4
9
= 2544
4
9
(328)
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3. Period 1: (40,60) Period 2: (?,662
3
)
What strategy does the absolute profit maximizing leader choose?
The follower’s reaction function:
R−i : y−i(yi) = 66
2
3
− 1
2
yi (329)
The leader’s profit function:
max
yi
pii =
[
160− yi −
(
66
2
3
− 1
2
yi
)]
yi − 40yi (330)
∂pii
∂yi
= 53
1
3
− yi = 0 (331)
y∗i = 53
1
3
(332)
Aggregation over two periods yields:
Πi = pii,period1 + pii,period2 = 800 + 0 = 800 (333)
analogously for the other firm:
Π−i = pi−i,period1 + pi−i,period2 = 1200 + 888
8
9
= 2088
8
9
(334)
4. Period 1: (40,60) Period 2: (531
3
,?)
What is the follower’s optimal absolute profit maximizing strategy given the
leader also chooses an absolute profit maximizing quantity?
The follower’s reaction function:
R−i : y−i(53
1
3
) = 66
2
3
− 1
2
53
1
3
(335)
y∗−i = 40 (336)
Aggregation over two periods yields:
Πi = pii,period1 + pii,period2 = 800 + 1422
2
9
= 2222
2
9
(337)
analogously for the other firm:
Π−i = pi−i,period1 + pi−i,period2 = 1200 + 1600 = 2800 (338)
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I Individual Behavior Cournot Game
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Figure 42: Bar chart of player one’s quantity choices
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Figure 44: Bar chart of player two’s quantity choices
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Figure 45: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player two
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Figure 46: Bar chart of player three’s quantity choices
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Figure 47: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player three
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
L C H W
Player 4 
Period 1
Period 2
Figure 48: Bar chart of player four’s quantity choices
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Figure 49: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player four
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Figure 50: Bar chart of player five’s quantity choices
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Figure 51: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player five
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Figure 52: Bar chart of player six’s quantity choices
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Figure 53: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player six
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Figure 54: Bar chart of player seven’s quantity choices
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Figure 55: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player seven
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Figure 56: Bar chart of player eight’s quantity choices
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Figure 57: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player eight
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Figure 58: Bar chart of player nine’s quantity choices
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Figure 59: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player nine
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Figure 60: Bar chart of player ten’s quantity choices
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Figure 61: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player ten
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Figure 62: Bar chart of player eleven’s quantity choices
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Figure 63: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player eleven
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Figure 64: Bar chart of player 12’s quantity choices
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Figure 65: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 12
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Figure 66: Bar chart of player 13’s quantity choices
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Figure 67: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 13
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
L C H W
Player 14 
Period 1
Period 2
Figure 68: Bar chart of player 14’s quantity choices
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Figure 69: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 14
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Figure 70: Bar chart of player 15’s quantity choices
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Figure 71: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 15
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Figure 72: Bar chart of player 16’s quantity choices
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Figure 73: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 16
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Figure 74: Bar chart of player 17’s quantity choices
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Figure 75: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 17
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Figure 76: Bar chart of player 18’s quantity choices
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Figure 77: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 18
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Figure 78: Bar chart of player 19’s quantity choices
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Figure 79: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 19
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Figure 80: Bar chart of player 20’s quantity choices
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Figure 81: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 20
165
J Individual Behavior Stackelberg Game
166
01
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
L C AS H RS
Player 1 
period 1
Period 2
Figure 82: Bar chart of player one’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 83: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player one
(Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 85: Strategies Player 1 and 11 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 86: Bar chart of player two’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 87: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player two
(Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 88: Strategies Player 2 and 12 Period 1 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 89: Strategies Player 2 and 12 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 90: Bar chart of player three’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 91: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player three
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Figure 92: Strategies Player 3 and 13 Period 1 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 93: Strategies Player 3 and 13 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 94: Bar chart of player four’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 95: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player four
(Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 96: Strategies Player 4 and 14 Period 1 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 97: Strategies Player 4 and 14 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 98: Bar chart of player five’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 99: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player five
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Figure 100: Strategies Player 5 and 15 Period 1 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 101: Strategies Player 5 and 15 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 102: Bar chart of player six’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 103: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player six
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Figure 105: Strategies Player 6 and 16 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 106: Bar chart of player seven’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 109: Strategies Player 7 and 17 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
173
01
2
3
4
5
6
L C AS H RS
Player 8 
Series1
Series2
Figure 110: Bar chart of player eight’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 113: Strategies Player 8 and 18 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 114: Bar chart of player nine’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 116: Strategies Player 9 and 19 Period 1 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 117: Strategies Player 9 and 19 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 118: Bar chart of player ten’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 119: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player ten
(Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 120: Strategies Player 10 and 20 Period 1 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 121: Strategies Player 10 and 20 Period 2 (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 122: Bar chart of player eleven’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 123: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player eleven
(Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 124: Bar chart of player 12’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 125: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 12
(Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 126: Bar chart of player 13’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 128: Bar chart of player 14’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 129: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 14
(Stackelberg Game)
178
01
2
3
4
5
6
L C AS H RS
Player 15 
Series1
Series2
Figure 130: Bar chart of player 15’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 132: Bar chart of player 16’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 133: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 16
(Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 134: Bar chart of player 17’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 136: Bar chart of player 18’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 137: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 18
(Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 138: Bar chart of player 19’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 139: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 19
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Figure 140: Bar chart of player 20’s quantity choices (Stackelberg Game)
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Figure 141: Time series for all 10 games of quantity choices of player 20
(Stackelberg Game)
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